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QUESTIONS PRESENTED
A class action may be certified only if the four prerequisites of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a)
are satisfied (numerosity, commonality, typicality,
and fair-and-adequate representation), and the class
action falls within one of Rule 23(b)’s defined types.
The third subpart of Rule 23(b) is at issue here, and
it allows certification only if “the court finds that the
questions of law or fact common to class members
predominate over any questions affecting only
individual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.” Fed. R. Civ.
P. 23(b)(3). In addition, class certification “shall not
abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right”
under the Rules Enabling Act. 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b).
This case presents two questions about these requirements. They are:
1. Whether individual damage calculations alone
can overwhelm questions common to the class, precluding certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
2. Whether plaintiffs may use a formula that relies
on a uniform measure of harm derived from the average experience of all class members as common
proof of damages.

(i)

ii
PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS
1. Google Inc., petitioner on review, was defendant-appellee below.
2. Pulaski & Middleman, LLC; JIT Packaging,
Inc.; RK West, Inc.; and Richard Oesterling, respondents on review, were plaintiffs-appellants below.
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RULE 29.6 DISCLOSURE STATEMENT
Google Inc. is a wholly owned subsidiary of Alphabet Inc., a publicly traded company. No other company owns 10% or more of Google’s stock.
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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States
_________
No. 15_________
GOOGLE INC.,
v.

Petitioner,

PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC, et al.,
Respondents.
_________
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Ninth Circuit
_________
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
_________
Petitioner Google Inc. respectfully petitions for a
writ of certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in
this case.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Ninth Circuit is reported at 802
F.3d 979. Pet. App. 1a-21a. Its orders denying rehearing en banc, Pet. App. 66a-67a, and staying its
mandate pending the filing of this certiorari petition,
Pet. App. 65a, are unreported. The opinion of the
United States District Court for the Northern District of California denying class certification is not
published in the Federal Supplement, but is available at 2012 WL 28068. Pet. App. 22a-59a.

(1)

2
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the Ninth Circuit was entered on
September 21, 2015, and a timely petition for rehearing was denied on December 8, 2015. Pet. App. 66a67a. This Court’s jurisdiction rests on 28 U.S.C.
§ 1254(1).
STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED
This case involves the Rules Enabling Act, 28
U.S.C. § 2072, and Federal Rule of Procedure 23,
which are reproduced at Pet. App. 68a-76a.
INTRODUCTION
This is a case where the Ninth Circuit has impermissibly diluted Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23’s
rigorous requirements for certification of class actions. The court of appeals reversed the district
court’s refusal to certify a class of Google advertisers
claiming violations of California’s unfair-competition
laws. Its decision departs from the fundamental
principles of class certification that this Court laid
down in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct.
2541 (2011), and Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S.
Ct. 1426 (2013), joining and creating circuit splits in
the process. Google respectfully asks the Court to
grant review and reverse.
The first question presented concerns Rule
23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement. To meet that
requirement, a plaintiff must show that “questions of
law or fact common to class members predominate
over any questions affecting only individual members.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). In many cases, although common questions of liability exist, there are
nonetheless individual questions of damages. So the
question frequently arises: Can individual damage

3
calculations alone overwhelm questions common to
the class, defeating certification under Rule 23(b)(3)?
The courts of appeals are divided. Five circuits—
the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits—have answered yes: Individual damage calculations alone can defeat certification under Rule
23(b)(3). By contrast, the Ninth Circuit in this case
answered no: Individual damage calculations alone
cannot defeat certification. That decision flies in the
face of this Court’s decision in Comcast, which held
that “individual damage calculations” not simply
can, but sometimes “will,” “overwhelm questions
common to the class.” 133 S. Ct. at 1433 (emphasis
added). Because this important and recurring issue
has divided the circuits, and because the Ninth Circuit plainly erred, this Court should agree to decide
the first question presented.
The second question presented challenges the
Ninth Circuit’s embrace of a general, one-size-fits-all
formula to resolve damages for the whole class. The
court of appeals approved the formula because it did
“not turn on individual circumstances.”
Pet.
App. 21a. But that, of course, is precisely the problem. This Court has expressly “disapprove[d]” just
that “novel project” of computing class damages by a
formula “without further individualized proceedings.” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Wal-Mart’s
holding on that point directly follows from the Rules
Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2071 et seq., which “forbids
interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right.’ ” Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at
2561 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b)). “Trial by Formula” forecloses individual defenses and sets damages
for plaintiffs at amounts divorced from their particular circumstances, thereby giving plaintiffs greater
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substantive rights than they would have in individual proceedings. Id.
Consistent with the Rules Enabling Act, the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have all
held that damages in class actions cannot be computed using an “abstract analysis of ‘averages.’ ”
E.g., Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops,
Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir. 1998). The Ninth
Circuit’s decision erroneously joins the minority view
of the Eighth and Tenth Circuits, contrary to WalMart’s instruction. The cert-worthiness of this question is already established; it is currently pending
before the Court in Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo,
135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015) (granting review of Eighth
Circuit decision). See Pet. at i, Tyson Foods, Inc. v.
Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Mar. 19, 2015), 2015 WL
1285369 (first question presented).
In short, the Ninth Circuit’s decision “conflicts
with” Comcast and Wal-Mart, and it creates and
deepens divisions among the circuits regarding classcertification standards. It threatens to turn the
Ninth Circuit into a class-action magnet. And, on
the merits, this case should not proceed as a class
action; the court of appeals was only able to approve
that course by bending the substantive law of restitution to fit the needs of class adjudication and robbing Google of its right to present defenses. Procedural rules are supposed to serve substantive law,
not the other way around. The decision below would
result in an unwieldy class comprised of hundreds of
thousands of different advertisers who purchased
millions of different ads from Google over the course
of several different years. That entire class will demand restitution from Google for alleged violations of
California’s unfair competition laws—never mind
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that some putative class members benefited from the
alleged misconduct. And it will do so by punching
numbers into an abstract formula, even though—as
the district court rightly found—determining the
proper amount of restitution for each class member
requires a “complex and highly individualized analysis.” Pet. App. 56a.
This Court should grant review to bring the Ninth
Circuit’s class-action jurisprudence in line with Comcast and Wal-Mart, and to resolve the multiple conflicts among the courts of appeals.
STATEMENT
A. Factual Background
Google AdWords is an online advertising service.
During the class period, AdWords allowed advertisers to place ads alongside Google search results or on
other webpages that were part of Google’s advertising network. Pet. App. 23a. The ads generally were
matched to Internet users based on the search queries the users entered on Google (or other search engines) or the subject-matter of the websites they
viewed. Pet. App. 5a-6a. The ads typically were
short strings of text with hyperlinks that, when
clicked, took the user to the advertiser’s website. Id.
Advertisers paid Google each time an Internet user
clicked on an advertisement link. Pet. App. 5a.
Plaintiffs in this suit all purchased advertising services from Google AdWords. They allege that Google
misled them in violation of California law by showing
their ads on two types of websites: “parked domains”
and “error pages.” Pet. App. 6a. A “parked domain”
is a webpage with a registered address that is relatively undeveloped and consists primarily of ads or
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links. Id. “Error pages” act as placeholders when a
user enters an address that does not match a registered URL. Id. Google generally displayed ads on
parked domains and error pages that were matched
to terms the user entered into the address bar of a
web browser, or searches a user made on the website,
so the ads a user saw were typically relevant to what
the user was looking for. Pet. App. 5a-6a, 24a.
B. Proceedings Below
Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against
Google under California’s Unfair Competition and
Fair Advertising Laws. They sought restitution for
Google’s alleged failure to inform them that it would
display their ads on two types of purportedly “low
quality” sites: “parked domains” and “error pages.”
Pet. App. 41a. They moved to certify a class—for the
purpose of establishing liability and damages—
which consisted of “[a]ll Google AdWords Customers
who, during the [class period], were charged by
Google for clicks on their advertisements that Google
placed on parked domains or error pages.” Pet.
App. 38a (citation omitted).
The district court denied Plaintiffs’ motion for certification of a Rule 23(b)(3) class. The court found that
there was a single common issue: “whether Google’s
alleged omissions were misleading to a reasonable
AdWords customer.” Pet. App. 51a. But it was “unconvinced” that “commonalities predominate.” Pet.
App. 54a. The main obstacle was “the individual nature of the restitutionary relief sought.” Id. Plaintiffs’ theory rested on “what AdWords customers
would have paid ‘but for’ the alleged misstatements
or omissions.” Pet. App. 55a. Yet, as the district
court explained, “any effort to determine what adver-
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tisers ‘would have paid’ * * * requires a complex and
highly individualized analysis of advertiser behavior
for each particular ad that was placed.”
Pet.
App. 56a.
Plaintiffs had proposed three methods of calculating restitution, none of which sufficiently took into
account the circumstances surrounding the AdWords
auctions. Pet. App. 57a. Plaintiffs’ primary proposal—which was the only one it defended on appeal,
see CA9 Appellants’ Opening Br. 27-37; CA9 Appellants’ Reply Br. 16-20—is called the “Smart Pricing
Method.” “Smart Pricing” refers to a discount that
Google gives advertisers as a business accommodation in certain circumstances. Pet. App. 57a. It involves looking at the aggregate performance of ads
on a given webpage, and comparing it to the performance of ads on a benchmark page like google.com.
Pet. App. 57a, 62a-63a. Performance is measured by
a “conversion rate,” which is the rate at which a click
on an ad link leads to a particular business result for
the advertiser, like a purchase or a sign-up. Pet.
App. 5a & n.2. Google uses Smart Pricing in certain
contexts to discount the cost-per-click bid on a website with lower performance. Id.
Plaintiffs sought to use that Smart Pricing discount
as a way to measure restitution. “The amount of restitution owed a class member would be the difference
between the amount the advertiser actually paid and
the amount paid reduced by the Smart Pricing discount ratio.” Pet. App. 7a. As the district court explained, the “ ‘Smart Pricing Method’ would apply a
uniform discount on all ads placed on a parked domain—even if an individual advertiser’s ads on that
web page outperformed ads appearing on other types
of websites.” Pet. App. 57a. Take one of the named
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plaintiffs, RK West, as an example. RK West had a
higher conversion rate on parked domains than on
the benchmark site. Id. In other words, RK West
benefited from Google’s practice because its performance was better on parked domains. Because of
this, the district court correctly concluded that “applying a uniform discount” to all putative class members, regardless of their circumstances, was “too inexact a solution.” Pet. App. 63a. It held that “individualized issues of restitution permeate the class
claims,” and “the proposed class is not ‘sufficiently
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.’ ”
Pet. App. 58a-59a (quoting Amchem Prods., Inc. v.
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997)); see also Pet.
App. 60a-64a (denying petition for reconsideration).
A panel of the Ninth Circuit reversed, concluding
that the predominance requirement was satisfied. In
reaching that conclusion, the court of appeals first
held that there were no individual questions regarding “entitlement to restitution.” Pet. App. 14a (emphasis added). The court thus perceived no individual issues of liability. See Pet. App. 11a-14a. The
court then held that any differences in calculating
the amount of restitution could not predominate.
That is because, the court declared, “damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification.”
Pet.
App. 14a (citation omitted). Applying that categorical rule, the court did not even consider whether, in
the particular circumstances of this case, there were
any individual issues of damages—much less whether those issues overwhelmed questions common to
the class. Finally, the court found that a simple formula based on the Smart Pricing Method was an acceptable way to measure restitution for class members.
Pet. App. 21a.
“Because restitution * * *
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measures what the advertiser would have paid at the
outset, rather than accounting for what occurred after the purchase, using a ratio from Google’s data
that adjusts for web page quality is both targeted to
remedying the alleged harm and does not turn on individual circumstances.” Id. The panel therefore reversed the district court’s decision and remanded.
The Ninth Circuit denied rehearing en banc,
Pet. App. 66a-67a, but upon Google’s motion and
over Plaintiffs’ objection, the court of appeals stayed
its mandate pending the filing of this certiorari petition. Pet. App. 65a.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
I. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW
TO DECIDE WHETHER INDIVIDUAL
DAMAGE CALCULATIONS ALONE CAN
OVERWHELM QUESTIONS COMMON TO
THE CLASS.
The first question presented concerns Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement; it asks whether individual damage calculations alone can overwhelm questions common to the
class, precluding certification. This recurring and
important question of class-action procedure has divided the federal courts of appeals. And the Ninth
Circuit’s resolution of that question in this case was
plainly wrong. Accordingly, this Court should grant
certiorari and reverse.
A. This Important And Recurring Question Has Divided The Circuits.
Review is warranted to resolve a clean split over a
fundamental issue: Whether individual damage cal-
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culations alone can overwhelm questions common to
the class, defeating certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
1. Five courts of appeals—the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits—have answered yes:
Individual damage calculations alone can defeat
class certification under Rule 23(b)(3).
As the Third Circuit has held, “there are cases
where the question of damages is so central that it
can, in some sense, overtake the question of liability.” Chiang v. Veneman, 385 F.3d 256, 273 (3d Cir.
2004), abrogated on other grounds by In re Hydrogen
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 318 n.18 (3d
Cir. 2008). That ruling remains the law in the Third
Circuit. As one district court explained, the relevant
inquiry is “whether the individual proofs of damages
predominate over the common liability issues * * * —
that is, whether this is []one of those cases [‘]where
the question of damages is so central that it can, in
some sense, overtake the question of liability.’ ”
Johnson v. GEICO Cas. Co., 310 F.R.D. 246, 255 (D.
Del. 2015) (quoting Chiang, 385 F.3d at 273). Johnson involved a putative class of insureds who brought
suit against their automobile insurer. The plaintiffs
alleged that the insurer engaged in bad faith and
consumer fraud by using arbitrary rules to determine whether to pay personal injury protection benefits. Id. at 248. The district court originally granted
Rule 23(b)(3) class certification, but later decertified
the class because it concluded individual damages
issues predominated. Id. at 254-256. The court explained: “Although there are common questions of
law and fact as to the substantive liability of [the insurers] for their allegedly deficient processes and
misrepresentations, these common questions would
consume much less litigation time than the proof of
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damages for each individual class member.” Id. at
255. Accordingly, although “[t]he individualized determinations with respect to the relief to be granted
do not undermine Rule 23(a) commonality as to liability issues,” they “predominate over them under
Rule 23(b)(3)’s more demanding standard.” Id.
The Fourth Circuit reached the same conclusion in
Lienhart v. Dryvit Systems, Inc., 255 F.3d 138 (4th
Cir. 2001). In that case, a putative class of homeowners sued a manufacturer for negligently designing a home siding product. Id. at 141. The district
court certified a Rule 23(b)(3) class, but the Fourth
Circuit vacated that ruling. Id. at 151. The court of
appeals explained that the “functional equivalent of
a full-blown trial on damages causation for each putative class member would be required.” Id. at 149.
And according to the court, that need alone—the
need for “individualized proof of damages”—
“destroy[ed] predominance.” Id. at 149; see also
Brown v. Nucor Corp., 785 F.3d 895, 924 (4th Cir.
2015) (citing Comcast as “explaining that individual
damage-related questions might destroy predominance”); Ward v. Dixie Nat’l Life Ins. Co., 595 F.3d
164, 180 (4th Cir. 2010) (“individualized damage determinations cut against class certification under
Rule 23(b)(3)”); Windham v. American Brands, Inc.,
565 F.2d 59, 68 (4th Cir. 1977) (holding that the
“damage aspect of [a] case predominate[s]” where
“the issue of damages * * * requires separate minitrials” (brackets and citations omitted)); Martin v.
Mountain State Univ., Inc., No. 5:12-cv-03937, 2014
WL 1333251, at *4 (S.D.W. Va. Mar. 31, 2014) (“the
varied and diverse circumstances of the proposed
class members indicates that individualized proof of
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damages and causation will be required; such individualized proof defeats predominance”).
The decisions of the Fifth Circuit are to the same
effect. For example, in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. AT&T
Corp., 339 F.3d 294 (5th Cir. 2003), a putative class
of plaintiffs sued AT&T for monopolizing the market
for caller-ID service. Id. at 297. In affirming the denial of class certification, the court of appeals held
that the plaintiffs’ motion “founder[ed] on the issue
of the amount of damages.” Id. at 303. As the court
explained, “any adequate estimation of actual damages” would require “individualized inquiries.” Id. at
304. And given the need for “the calculation of individualized actual economic damages,” the court held
that the predominance requirement could not be satisfied. Id. at 308; see also id. at 304 (“In light of the
need for such individualized inquiries, we cannot
conclude that the plaintiffs have established that the
requirements of Rule 23(b)(3) can be satisfied in the
present case.”). Numerous other Fifth Circuit decisions have denied Rule 23(b)(3) certification on the
same basis: the need for individual damage calculations alone. See, e.g., Steering Comm. v. Exxon Mobil
Corp., 461 F.3d 598, 603 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that
“individual issues of medical causation and damages”
predominate); O’Sullivan v. Countrywide Home
Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 744 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding that “individualized calculations of damages predominate”); Allison v. Citgo Petroleum Corp., 151
F.3d 402, 419 (5th Cir. 1998) (holding that “individual-specific issues relating to the plaintiffs’ claims for
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compensatory and punitive damages” predominate). 1
And district courts within the Fifth Circuit continue
to apply the same rule today. See, e.g., St. Gregory
Cathedral Sch. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 6:12-CV-739,
2015 WL 5604763, at *7 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 23, 2015)
(denying class certification in part because of Steering Committee; holding that “calculating damages
will require individual inquiries that will also predominate over any common issues that may be presented by this case”); Simms v. Jones, 296 F.R.D.
485, 504-505, 507-508 (N.D. Tex. 2013) (denying
class certification based on Bell Atlantic), appeal
docketed, No. 15-10242 (5th Cir. Mar. 27, 2015); Haley v. Merial, Ltd., 292 F.R.D. 339, 360 (N.D. Miss.
2013) (“The Fifth Circuit has held that the necessity
of calculating damages on an individual basis, by itself, can be grounds for not certifying a class.”).
The Eleventh Circuit is in agreement. In Sacred
Heart Health Systems, Inc. v. Humana Military
Healthcare Services, Inc., 601 F.3d 1159 (11th Cir.
2010), a putative class of hospitals sued a health
maintenance organization (HMO), alleging that the
In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 754 (2014), addressed a slightly different issue.
The court there explained that the absence of “a formula for
classwide measurement of damages” will not defeat certification
in a case where “predominance [i]s based not on common issues
of damages but on the numerous common issues of liability.”
Id. at 815. In other words, the court held that individualized
damage issues do not always defeat predominance; it did not
hold that individualized damages can never predominate. Rather, the Fifth Circuit simply affirmed the district court’s ruling
that “even without a common means of measuring damages
* * * common issues nonetheless predominated over the issues
unique to individual claimants.” Id. at 816.
1
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HMO “systematically underpaid them for medical
services.” Id. at 1164. The HMO argued that the
predominance requirement could not be satisfied in
light of its affirmative defenses. See id. at 1177-1178
(citation omitted). The district court, however, “minimized the impact of [those] defenses on the outcome
of the predominance inquiry, stating that the defenses ‘largely involve individualized damages issues, not
liability issues.’ ” Id. at 1178. On appeal, the court of
appeals reversed the certification of a Rule 23(b)(3)
class, “find[ing] no support in the text of Rule 23 or
interpretive case law for the district court’s rigid distinction between liability and damages.” Id. Even
when the individual issues involve damages, the
court explained, the “relevant inquiry” is still the
same: “whether common issues predominate over individual ones.” Id. at 1179. The Eleventh Circuit
therefore held that it was “clear error” for the district
court to “brush [the HMO’s defenses] aside as mere
‘damages’ issues.” Id. The upshot is that individual
issues can defeat predominance, even when they involve damages. The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed
that principle in Little v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 691
F.3d 1302 (11th Cir. 2012), upholding the district
court’s conclusion that “variation in individual damages render[ed] the class unsuitable for certification
on predominance grounds.” Id. at 1308.
The D.C. Circuit is in the same camp. In In re Rail
Freight Fuel Surcharge Antitrust Litigation, 725 F.3d
244 (D.C. Cir. 2013), a putative class of shippers
sued a group of freight railroad companies, alleging
antitrust violations. Id. at 247. The court of appeals
held that the plaintiffs could meet the predominance
requirement only if they could “offer common evidence of classwide injury.” Id. at 253. As the court
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put it: “No damages model, no predominance, no
class certification.” Id. In other words, without an
adequate classwide damages model, individualized
damages questions alone would defeat predominance
and class certification. Accordingly, the D.C. Circuit
vacated certification of the class and ordered the district court to reconsider the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ damages model. Id. at 255. 2
2. The Ninth Circuit’s decision in this case conflicts with the decisions of the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. As explained above,
each of those five circuits has held that individual
damage calculations alone can overwhelm questions
common to the class. The Ninth Circuit, our nation’s
largest, has now reached the opposite conclusion,
holding in this case that “damage calculations alone
cannot defeat certification.” Pet. App. 14a (emphasis
added; citation omitted); see also Pet. App. 17a
(“[D]ifferences in damage calculations do not defeat
class certification * * * .”). Thus, while courts in other circuits would have asked (1) whether there were
any individual issues of damages and (2) whether
those issues overwhelmed any questions common to
the class, the Ninth Circuit in this case did neither.
Instead, having concluded that there were no individual issues of liability, see Pet. App. 11a-14a, the
Ninth Circuit held that it was simply irrelevant
whether there were any individual issues of damag2
The Tenth Circuit also has generally aligned with the majority view. See Wallace B. Roderick Revocable Living Trust v.
XTO Energy, Inc., 725 F.3d 1213, 1220 (10th Cir. 2013) (explaining that “material differences in damages determinations”
that “require individualized inquiries” may “destroy[]” predominance).
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es, see Pet. App. 14a-18a. That categorical holding—
that individual damage calculations alone cannot defeat certification under Rule 23(b)(3), see Pet.
App. 14a, 17a, 18a—cannot be reconciled with the
decisions of the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Eleventh, and
D.C. Circuits.
3. The time is now to resolve this circuit split. The
Ninth Circuit, which denied rehearing en banc in
this case, has given no indication of changing its interpretation of Rule 23(b)(3). 3 And as long as the decision below is permitted to stand, plaintiffs across
the country will elect to file their putative class actions in the Ninth Circuit, where they know they can
satisfy the predominance requirement regardless of
the individual damages they seek. See Robert H.
Klonoff, The Decline of Class Actions, 90 Wash. U. L.
Rev. 729, 823 (2013) (explaining that plaintiffs may
choose to file in “circuits that are most receptive to
class actions”). Indeed, district courts in that circuit
have already begun relying on the decision below—
and its categorical rule regarding individual damage
calculations—in allowing suits to proceed as Rule
23(b)(3) classes. See, e.g., Robinson v. Open Top
Sightseeing S.F., LLC, No. 14-cv-852, 2015 WL
9304041, at *4 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 22, 2015); O’Connor v.
Uber Techs., Inc., No. 13-cv-03826, 2015 WL
8292006, at *15 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2015), appeal
docketed, No. 15-17420 (9th Cir. Dec. 10, 2015).

3
As previously mentioned, supra p. 9, the Ninth Circuit did,
however, stay its mandate pending the filing of a certiorari petition in this case. The standard for such a stay is “that the certiorari petition would present a substantial question and that
there is good cause for a stay.” Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2)(A).
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The practical consequences of this split are therefore sweeping. More plaintiffs will file their class actions in the Ninth Circuit, where more motions for
class certification will be granted—despite the presence of individual damage questions that would lead
those very cases to be denied certification in other
circuits. And those class-certification orders will
likely dictate the outcome of many of those cases,
“set[ting] the litigation on a path toward resolution
by way of settlement, not full-fledged testing of the
plaintiffs’ case by trial.” Richard A. Nagareda, Class
Certification in the Age of Aggregate Proof, 84 N.Y.U.
L. Rev. 97, 99 (2009). Indeed, by “increas[ing] the
defendant’s potential damages liability and litigation
costs,” class certification often forces a defendant to
“abandon” even a “meritorious defense.” Coopers &
Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 476 (1978).
The question presented thus calls out for this
Court’s review. The circuits are squarely divided,
and the question is important and recurring. This
Court should intervene now.
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Decision Is Contrary To Supreme Court Precedent.
Review should be granted for an additional reason:
The Ninth Circuit’s categorical rule that individual
damage calculations alone can never predominate is
wrong. Indeed, it flatly contradicts this Court’s decision in Comcast, which held that “individual damage
calculations” alone can—and in fact did in that
case—“overwhelm questions common to the class.”
133 S. Ct. at 1433.
In Comcast, a putative class of cable-television subscribers sued their cable provider for alleged antitrust violations. Id. at 1430. The plaintiffs proposed

18
four theories of antitrust liability, but the district
court accepted only one—the so-called “overbuilder”
theory—“as capable of classwide proof.” Id. at 1431.
The district court further found that the damages resulting from that theory “could be calculated on a
classwide basis,” using a model developed by the
plaintiffs’ expert. Id. In light of that determination,
the district court concluded that the proposed class
met Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement, and
the Third Circuit affirmed. Id. at 1430-1431.
This Court reversed. The Court concluded that the
plaintiffs’ model failed to attribute damages to “any
one particular theory” of liability. Id. at 1434. Instead, the Court explained, the model “assumed the
validity of all four theories” advanced by the plaintiffs—not just the overbuilder theory, but also the
three theories that had been rejected. Id. So while
the plaintiffs had presented a classwide theory of liability, they had failed to present a classwide method
for measuring damages. And the Court held that absent such a method, the plaintiffs “cannot show Rule
23(b)(3) predominance:
Questions of individual
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm questions common to the class.” Id. at 1433. Comcast
thus holds that “individual damage calculations”
alone can—and sometimes will—“overwhelm questions common to the class.” Id.
That makes sense. After all, the text of Rule
23(b)(3) does not distinguish between liability and
damages. See Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1178 (finding “no support in the text of Rule 23” for a “rigid
distinction between liability and damages”). It does
not say, for example, that class certification is appropriate only if “questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions of li-
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ability affecting only individual members.” Rather,
under the plain text of the rule, “any questions affecting only individual members” can overwhelm
questions common to the class and thus defeat certification. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3) (emphasis added).
Comcast’s holding therefore follows directly from the
text of the rule itself: Individual damage calculations—like any other “questions affecting only individual members”—can defeat certification of a Rule
23(b)(3) class.
This is not to say that individual damage calculations will always overwhelm questions common to
the class. In certain circumstances, certification of a
Rule 23(b)(3) class might be appropriate, notwithstanding the presence of individual issues involving
damages. But for a court to make that determination, it would have to conduct the “rigorous analysis”
that Rule 23 requires. Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433
(citation omitted). The Ninth Circuit did not conduct
that analysis here. Instead of examining the particular circumstances of this case to determine whether
“questions of liability to the class * * * predominate[]
over * * * individual issues relating to damages,” Sacred Heart, 601 F.3d at 1179 (brackets in original;
citation omitted), the Ninth Circuit simply declared,
as a categorical rule, that “damage calculations alone
cannot defeat certification,” Pet. App. 14a (citation
omitted). 4
The Ninth Circuit cited Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778
F.3d 401 (2d Cir. 2015), in support of its position. See Pet.
App. 17a-18a. But Roach held that individualized damage calculations do not always predominate, 778 F.3d at 408; it did not
hold that individualized damage calculations can never predominate. The district court’s error in that case was that it “did not
4
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That decision is contrary to the decisions of other
circuits, this Court’s decision in Comcast, and the
plain text of Rule 23(b)(3). Accordingly, this Court
should grant full-dress review to resolve the circuit
split and correct the Ninth Circuit’s error. In the alternative, because the Ninth Circuit’s decision is so
obviously wrong, this Court may wish to summarily
reverse.
II. THIS COURT SHOULD GRANT REVIEW TO
DECIDE WHETHER PLAINTIFFS MAY USE
FORMULAS BASED ON THE AVERAGE
CLASS
MEMBER’S
EXPERIENCE
AS
COMMON PROOF OF DAMAGES.
The second question presented addresses the Ninth
Circuit’s approval of a formula-based approach to
classwide restitutionary relief. The court of appeals
held that restitution could be determined for each
class member using an averages-based formula that
applied a uniform discount rate. Pet. App. 20a-21a.
It was enough that the rate was extrapolated “from
Google’s data” and purported to serve as a uniform
means to “adjust[] for web page quality.” Pet.
App. 21a. That, according to the panel, was a sufficient indicator of “the value of the service at the time
of purchase,” which did “not turn on individual circumstances.” Pet. App. 20a. The question is whether plaintiffs may rely on a damages model that uses
a uniform measure of harm, derived from the averevaluate whether the individualized damages questions predominate over the common questions of liability”; instead, the
court refused to certify the class “only because the district court
concluded damages were not capable of measurement on a
classwide basis.” Id. at 408-409.
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age experience of class members, as common evidence of damages. See Pet. App. 57a.
A. The Courts Of Appeals Are Divided
On The Propriety Of Averages-Based
Class Damages Models.
The courts of appeals are in conflict over the answer to this question. See Pet. 3, 15-21, 24, Tyson
Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, No. 14-1146 (Mar. 19,
2015), 2015 WL 1285369 (describing split among the
courts of appeals on this issue). The Second, Fourth,
Fifth, and Seventh Circuits have answered no; plaintiffs may not resort to a statistical-averages-derived
model to prove classwide monetary relief. The court
below joins the Eighth and Tenth Circuits in answering yes.
1. The four-circuit majority rule is that models for
classwide monetary relief cannot use averages to
overcome individual calculation disparities. For example, in a state-unfair-competition-law case like
this one, the Fourth Circuit disallowed the use of averages-based evidence as a “shortcut” to prove classwide damages. Broussard v. Meineke Discount Muffler Shops, Inc., 155 F.3d 331, 343 (4th Cir. 1998). A
class of franchisees alleged that their franchisor had
not told them about the large commission rate for
expenditures paid out of the franchisees’ collective
advertising account. Id. at 335. The franchisees alleged that they had lost sales as a result of the misallocated funds. Id. at 336. At trial, “[p]laintiffs’ expert outlined a damages formula, by which he purported to calculate the lost profits damages of all
class members on a ‘global’ basis.” Id. He opined
that the franchisees had all lost a uniform amount of
sales with a uniform profit margin. Id.
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Like in this case, the plaintiffs’ recovery model was
based “on abstract analysis of ‘averages’ ” such as
“the average effect of ads on sales,” and “the average
profit margin.” Id. at 343. Unlike the court below,
however, the Fourth Circuit rejected this approach.
It explained: “That this shortcut was necessary in
order for this suit to proceed as a class action should
have been a caution signal to the district court that
class-wide proof of damages was impermissible.” Id.
Because the class was improperly certified, the
Fourth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment.
Id. at 334.
The Second Circuit follows suit. McLaughlin v.
American Tobacco Co., 522 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 2008),
abrogated on other grounds by Bridge v. Phoenix
Bond & Indem. Co., 553 U.S. 639 (2008). McLaughlin was a case dealing with the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C.
§ 1961 et seq., wherein smokers claimed they were
deceived into believing that “light” cigarettes were
healthier than regular cigarettes. McLaughlin, 522
F.3d at 220. The district court allowed classwide
damages to be calculated based on an “estimate of
the percentage of class members who were defrauded” and “an estimate of the average loss for each
plaintiff.” Id. at 231. The Second Circuit reversed,
soundly rejecting this approach as simply “mask[ing]
the prevalence of individual issues.” Id. at 232. “[I]t
offends both the Rules Enabling Act and the Due
Process Clause” to allow classwide damages to be
calculated in a manner “that does not accurately reflect the number of plaintiffs actually injured by defendants and that bears little or no relationship to
the amount of economic harm actually caused by defendants.” Id. at 231. So too here; yet the Ninth Cir-
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cuit went ahead and approved the calculation anyway.
The Seventh Circuit, too, agrees with the majority
rule. In Espenscheid v. DirectSat USA, LLC, 705
F.3d 770 (7th Cir. 2013), that court of appeals reviewed the decertification of a class action brought
under state wage-and-hour law (as well as a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act of
1938, 29 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.). Espenscheid, 705 F.3d
at 771. A putative class of satellite dish technicians
brought suit against their employer for wage violations. Id. at 772-773. The plaintiffs argued that testimony from 42 representative witnesses would “enable a rational determination of each class member’s
damages.” Id. at 776. The court of appeals disagreed. “Essentially they asked the district judge to
embark on a shapeless, freewheeling trial that would
combine liability and damages and would be virtually evidence-free so far as damages were concerned.”
Id. That prospect should sound familiar—it is exactly what the Ninth Circuit approved in this case:
Once a single class representative established liability, recovery at the uniform discount rate followed.
See Pet. App. 14a, 21a. The Seventh Circuit rejected
class certification using that same type of formula;
the Ninth Circuit should have done the same.
The Fifth Circuit rounds out the majority courts of
appeals’ view. That court has held that a class action that paves over individual differences in service
of class treatment violates the Rules Enabling Act,
the Due Process Clause, and potentially the Seventh
Amendment’s jury trial guarantee. In re Fibreboard
Corp., 893 F.2d 706 (5th Cir. 1990). The district
court in In re Fibreboard consolidated over 3,000 asbestos personal-injury cases for trial and directed
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that “certain representative cases w[ould] be fully
tried and the jury w[ould] decide the total, or ‘omnibus’ liability to the class.” Id. The Fifth Circuit took
issue with this approach, explaining that the “elements of compensation” in products-liability cases
“focus upon individuals, not groups.” Id. at 711. “To
create the requisite commonality for trial, the discrete components of the class members’ claims and
the asbestos manufacturers’ defenses must be submerged.” Id. at 712. Contrary to the Ninth Circuit’s
decision below, the Fifth Circuit recognized the “enabling acts prevent” that strategy. Id. And it believed
the issue important enough to grant mandamus, vacating the district court’s order directing a single
damages trial. Id.
2. Three circuits, including the court below, have
held differently. The Eighth Circuit reached the issue in a case where a class of poultry plant workers
claimed that they were not paid for all time worked.
Bouaphakeo v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 765 F.3d 791 (8th
Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S. Ct. 2806 (2015). The
district court certified the class, and at trial, it allowed the plaintiffs to use “average times calculated
from a sample” as evidence of the time the class as a
whole spent working on uncompensated activities.
Id. at 799. The Eighth Circuit affirmed the jury verdict for the plaintiffs. It rejected the defendant’s argument that the district court had allowed a prohibited “Trial by Formula.” Id. at 798-799. Instead, according to the court, the plaintiffs’ averages-based
calculations were “representative evidence” properly
used to determine classwide damages. Id. at 798.
That decision is currently on review in this Court.
The Tenth Circuit reached a similar result in an
antitrust case. In re Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768
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F.3d 1245 (10th Cir. 2014), pet. for cert. pending, No.
14-1091 (U.S. filed Mar. 9, 2015), joint motion to hold
pet. in abeyance pending approval of settlement filed
(U.S. Feb. 25, 2016). It affirmed class certification,
and the jury’s verdict for the plaintiffs, in a case
where the district court had allowed use of exactly
the same extrapolating technique that this Court rejected in Wal-Mart. Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768
F.3d at 1256-1257. See infra pp. 26-27. The relevant
distinction for the Tenth Circuit was that when WalMart discussed “trial by formula,” it “used this term
to describe a novel method of calculating damages,
where the district court determined the merits of individual claims by extrapolating from a sample set of
class members.” Urethane Antitrust Litig., 768 F.3d
at 1256 (emphasis added). According to the court,
“Wal-Mart does not prohibit certification based on
the use of extrapolation to calculate damages.” Id. at
1257 (emphasis added). And for that reason, the
court of appeals concluded that the class was properly certified. Id.
Finally, in the decision below, the Ninth Circuit
joined the minority view. It concluded that the
plaintiffs needed to establish only a rough approximation of damages, Pet. App. 20a, so a model that
did “not turn on individual circumstances” was perfectly permissible, Pet. App. 21a. That decision cannot be reconciled with the Second, Fourth, Fifth, and
Seventh Circuits, which all have held that a damages
model that lumps together disparate individual class
members without any means of differentiation violates the Rules Enabling Act and the Due Process
Clause. This Court’s review is necessary to resolve
the conflict.

26
3. The cert-worthiness of this question is already
established. In Tyson Foods, this Court granted certiorari to decide “[w]hether differences among individual class members may be ignored and a class action certified under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) * * * where liability and damages will be determined with statistical techniques that presume all
class members are identical to the average observed
in a sample.” See Pet. at i, Tyson Foods, supra, 2015
WL 1285369 (first question presented). If this Court
in Tyson Foods reverses the Eighth Circuit, the
Court should grant this petition, decide the merits of
the first question presented, and vacate the decision
below for reconsideration of the second question presented in light of Tyson Foods. If, on the other hand,
this Court decides Tyson Foods on other grounds,
this Court should grant this petition and decide the
merits of both questions presented. At a minimum,
therefore, this Court should agree to decide the first
question presented while holding the second question
presented for Tyson Foods. And if the Court does not
decide the latter question in that case, it should
grant plenary review in this one, because the Ninth
Circuit’s decision perpetuates an entrenched circuit
split and, as we next explain, is contrary to existing
precedent interpreting Rule 23(b)(3).
B. The Ninth Circuit’s Embrace Of “Trial By Formula” Conflicts With The
Decisions Of This Court.
1. The decision below cannot be squared with this
Court’s holding in Wal-Mart. The Court there held
that courts cannot, under the banner of Rule 23, “replace [individualized] proceedings with Trial by
Formula.” 131 S. Ct. at 2561. In that case, the
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Ninth Circuit had approved certification of a class of
“1.5 million * * * current or former Wal-Mart employees who allege[d] that the company discriminated
against them on the basis of their sex by denying
them equal pay or promotions.” Id. at 2547. The
court of appeals did not view “individualized determinations of each employee’s eligibility for backpay”
as an impediment to class certification. Id. at 2560.
Instead, the court “believed that it was possible to
replace [individualized] proceedings with Trial by
Formula” whereby the district court would identify a
sample set of class members, determine “the average
backpay award in the sample set,” and multiply that
number “to arrive at the entire class recovery.” Id.
at 2561.
This Court said no. It expressly “disapprove[d]” the
“novel project” of computing class damages by a formula “without further individualized proceedings.”
Id. “Because the Rules Enabling Act forbids interpreting Rule 23 to ‘abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right,’ 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b); a class cannot
be certified on the premise that Wal-Mart will not be
entitled to litigate its statutory defenses to individual claims.” Id. (citation omitted).
2. The decision below has just that effect. The
Ninth Circuit once again has endorsed a “Trial by
Formula” approach.
It approved, for classcertification purposes, the “Smart Pricing Method” of
calculating damages—a method that would allow
Plaintiffs to prove the amount allegedly owed to all
class members by simply “apply[ing] a uniform discount for all ads” to “measure[] the monetary loss.”
Pet. App. 21a, 57a. Therein lies the problem. The
uniform discount “does not turn on individual circumstances.” Pet. App. 21a. It instead is based on
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averages: a comparison between the average performance of advertisements on parked domains and error pages with the average performance of advertisements on a benchmark site. See generally Pet.
App. 5a. This is precisely the Rules Enabling Act
problem that Wal-Mart warned against.
First and foremost, the Smart Pricing Method gives
class members substantive recovery that would be
unavailable to them as individual plaintiffs. Restitution is “the return of the excess of what the plaintiff
gave the defendant over the value of what the plaintiff received.” Cortez v. Purolator Air Filtration
Prods. Co., 999 P.2d 706, 713 (Cal. 2000). Here, it is
measured by “the difference between what advertisers actually paid and what they would have paid had
Google informed them that their ads were being
placed on parked domains and error pages.” Pet.
App. 7a. That amount cannot be reduced to a single
uniform discount applied across the class. As is so
often the case for putative Rule 23(b)(3) class actions,
individualized damages issues overwhelm any purportedly common recovery questions.
As the district court found, AdWords prices are “determined through an auction process that generates
a separate cost for each advertiser for each ad and for
each click, with the specific amounts determined by
the interplay of the bidding strategies of the participating advertisers in a given auction.” Pet. App. 55a.
“[T]he ultimate amount Google charges for each ad
depends on dozens of factors that are unique to each
ad placement,” and “there is no ‘set’ price per click
paid by all advertisers that is knowable ahead of
time; instead all advertisers pay a different price
that is determined based on the interplay between
all of the differing maximum cost-per-clicks (i.e.,
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‘bids’) from all of the advertisers participating in the
auction.” Pet. App. 55a-56a (citation omitted). In
short, “any effort to determine what advertisers
‘would have paid’ under a different set of circumstances requires a complex and highly individualized
analysis of advertiser behavior for each particular ad
that was placed.” Pet. App. 56a. “Plaintiffs cannot
simply assume that a reduction in the demand for
advertising on AdWords among some undefined
group of advertisers would lead to a lower ‘but for’
price for all advertisers.” Id.
The uniform discount rate allows Plaintiffs to do
just that: assume, rather than prove, that a single,
uniform discount rate accurately calculates the prices that all class members would have paid if they
had known their advertisements would be displayed
on parked domains and error pages. Plaintiffs could
not make that assumption in individually litigated
cases. In individual litigation, each Plaintiff would
have to prove the extent of its economic injury with
“substantial evidence.” In re Tobacco Cases II, 192
Cal. Rptr. 3d 881, 893 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015) (citation
omitted).
For example, Plaintiffs that “actively
sought to have their ads placed on parked domains
and error pages” would have to prove that they
would have bid less for clicks on advertisements that
might appear on their preferred webpages. Pet.
App. 57a. Under the approved class-damages model,
however, these Plaintiffs instead can rely on the uniform discount as proof of the appropriate amount of
recovery. That consequence enlarges their substantive rights.
Second, the Smart Pricing Method is problematic
for yet another reason: It deprives Google of its ability to raise individualized equitable defenses. Cali-
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fornia law is quite clear that a trial court exercises
complete discretion whether to order restitution for
an unfair-competition-law violation. Cortez, 999 P.2d
at 716-717. And “[i]n deciding whether to grant the
remedy or remedies sought by a[n unfaircompetition-law] plaintiff, the court must permit the
defendant to offer [equitable] considerations” because
“consideration of the equities between the parties is
necessary to ensure an equitable result.” Id. at 717.
See also In re Tobacco Cases II, 192 Cal. Rptr. 3d at
895-896; Day v. AT&T Corp., 74 Cal. Rptr. 2d 55, 6465 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998). See generally Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 66 (1972) (“Due process requires that there be an opportunity to present every
available defense.”) (quoting American Sur. Co. v.
Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 168 (1932)).
Google is denied its right to present individualized
equitable defenses twice over. It cannot argue that
the equities bar restitutionary recovery for any individual class member because the Ninth Circuit determined that “restitution is available on a classwide
basis once the class representative makes the
threshold showing of liability.” Pet. App. 14a. And it
cannot argue that the equities minimize restitutionary recovery for any individual class member because the court of appeals approved a formula that
“does not turn on individual circumstances.” Pet.
App. 21a.
Google could do both of these things if it were litigating the case against individual plaintiffs. For example, if it were defending against an individual
claim by named Plaintiff RK West, Google could argue that the equities do not support restitution (or
they support at most a nominal sum) because RK
West achieved higher conversion rates on parked
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domains and error pages than on the Smart Pricing
benchmarks. Pet. App. 57a. It cannot make the
same argument here because the Ninth Circuit has
approved a class-damages model allowing Plaintiffs
to argue that all class members will be entitled to the
same discount rate once one representative makes
the threshold liability showing. Pet. App. 14a, 21a.
“[A] class cannot be certified on the premise that
[Google] will not be entitled to litigate” the actual
amount of restitution owed to Plaintiffs, and the
Ninth Circuit should not have approved certification
here. Wal-Mart, 131 S. Ct. at 2561. Indeed, to the
extent the Smart Pricing Method sweeps into its
reach those with no injury, there is also an Article III
problem. See Pet. at i, Tyson Foods, supra, 2015 WL
1285369 (second question presented).
Third and finally, the court of appeals’ decision ignores variation in appropriate restitutionary recovery in the service of class certification. The panel
even saw it as a benefit that its approved measure of
restitution did “not turn on individual circumstances,” Pet. App. 21a—not because they did not exist, or
were irrelevant, but because Plaintiffs had come up
with a formula that could gloss over those individual
differences. That produces exactly the type of arbitrary results that Comcast warned against when the
Court rejected a rule providing that “at the classcertification stage any method of measurement is acceptable so long as it can be applied classwide.” 133
S. Ct. at 1433. “Such a proposition would reduce
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement to a nullity.” Id. The Ninth Circuit’s contravention of that
principle should be corrected.
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CONCLUSION
The petition for a writ of certiorari should be
granted.
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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 12-16752
D.C. No. 5:08-cv-03369-EJD
_______________
PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; JIT PACKAGING, INC.;
RK WEST, INC.; RICHARD OESTERLING,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant-Appellee.
_______________
OPINION
_______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of California
Edward J. Davila, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted
December 9, 2014—San Francisco, California
Filed September 21, 2015
Before: A. Wallace Tashima and Richard A. Paez
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SUMMARY**
Class Action / Restitution
The panel reversed the district court’s denial of
class certification in an action brought by a putative
class of internet advertisers under California’s
Unfair Competition Law and Fair Advertising Law,
alleging that Google, Inc. misled them; and
remanded for further proceedings.
The plaintiff alleged that Google misled advertisers
by failing to disclose the placement of AdWorks [sic]
ads on parked domains and error pages; and sought,
on behalf of the putative class, restitution of moneys
Google wrongfully obtained from the putative class.
The panel held that the district court erred in
denying class certification based on its finding that
the putative class did not meet the predominance
requirement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). The
panel held that the district court erred by conflating
restitution calculation with the liability inquiry for
Unfair Competition Law and Fair Advertising Law
claims, and by failing to follow the rule in Yokoyama
v. Midland National Life Insurance Co., 594 F.3d
1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010) (holding that damages
calculations alone cannot defeat class certification).
The panel further held that the plaintiff’s proposed
method for calculating restitution was not
“arbitrary” under Comcast Corp. v. Behrend,
133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013).

**

This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the
court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of
the reader.
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OPINION
PAEZ, Circuit Judge:
Between 2004 and 2008, many online internet
advertisers used Google, Inc.’s (“Google”) AdWords
program, an auction-based program through which
advertisers would bid for Google to place their
advertisements on websites. Pulaski & Middleman,
LLC and several other named plaintiffs (“Pulaski”)1
brought this putative class action under California’s
Unfair Competition and Fair Advertising Laws,
alleging that Google misled them as to the types of
websites on which their advertisements could
appear.
The putative class initially sought
injunctive and restitutionary relief. After Google
changed certain features of the AdWords program,
Pulaski, upon filing a Third Amended Consolidated
Class Action Complaint, abandoned the claim for
injunctive relief. The only relief the putative class
now seeks is the equitable remedy of restitution.
1

Hereafter, “Pulaski” refers collectively to Pulaski &
Middleman, LLC and the other named plaintiffs, JIT Packaging
Inc., RK West, Inc., and Richard Oesterling.

4a
Pulaski appeals the district court’s denial of class
certification. The district court held that on the
claim for restitution, common questions did not
predominate over questions affecting individual class
members.
In denying certification, the court
reasoned that it was not bound by our decision in
Yokoyama v. Midland National Life Insurance Co.,
594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010).
It then
explained that determining which class members are
entitled to restitution and what amount each class
member should receive would require individual
inquiries that “permeate the class claims.”
Pulaski argues that the district court erred in
failing to follow Yokoyama. As explained below, we
agree. We therefore reverse the denial of class
certification and remand for further proceedings.
I. Background
A.
This case concerns Google’s AdWords program, an
auction-based program through which Google served
as an intermediary between website hosts and
advertisers. Through AdWords, internet advertisers
provided advertisements to Google and its third
party website-owner partners.
To participate,
advertisers entered Google-defined variables into the
AdWords interface on Google’s website, including the
maximum price per ad they would be willing to pay
and their overall budget. They also selected which
Google-defined categories of websites they wanted to
display the ad. Afterwards, using an auction-based
algorithm, AdWords determined the online
placement and price of the ad. Thus, during the
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class period, advertisers did not know in advance
exactly where their ads would appear.
Advertisers paid a particular price to Google each
time an Internet user “clicked” on their displayed ad.
The price of a particular click depended on several
factors:
the maximum bids of other AdWords
customers for clicks based on the same search term,
a “quality score” of the advertisement, and a “Smart
Pricing” discount applied to the website where the ad
had been placed. Google created and instituted
Smart Pricing, an internally-calculated price
adjustment, to adjust the advertiser’s bids to the
same levels that a “rational advertiser” would bid if
the rational advertiser had sufficient data about the
performance of ads on each website. Smart Pricing
is a ratio calculated by dividing the conversion rate2
for the lower-quality website by the conversion rate
for the same ad on google.com.
There are several categories of websites in play.
During the class period, an advertiser using
AdWords could request that its ads appear on Search
Feed sites, Content Network sites, or both. Search
Feed sites display AdWords ads along with search
results after a user searches for information using a
particular search term. After entering a particular
term, a user would be presented with both ordinary
search results and ads related to the search term.
Content Network websites, on the other hand, are
2

Using Google’s terminology, a “conversion” occurs when a
“click” leads to a particular business result defined by the
advertiser, like a purchase or a sign-up. A conversion rate is
the “number of conversions divided by the number of ad clicks
over a defined period of time.”
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full content sites, like nytimes.com, that publish
information independent of search results. Ads
would appear on these sites if the ad’s keywords
matched those of the website.
There are other categories of sites that did not
appear in the AdWords registration process: parked
domains and error pages. Parked domain pages are
undeveloped domains whose pages appear when
users type generic terms into a web browser. These
are pages of ads without content. Error pages
appear when a person inputs an unregistered web
address, or something other than a web address, into
a web browser’s address bar.
Typing this
information into an address bar used to result in
error messages, but during the class period inputting
this information resulted in error pages that offered
ads. Even though only Search Feed and Content
Network websites were listed in the AdWords
registration process, AdWords ads appeared on both
parked domains and error pages.
B.
Pulaski alleges that Google misled advertisers,
violating California’s Unfair Competition Law
(“UCL”), Cal Bus. & Prof. Code § 17200 et seq.,3 and
California’s Fair Advertising Law (“FAL”), § 17500 et
seq., by failing to disclose the placement of AdWords
ads on parked domains and error pages.
The
putative class consists of “[a]ll persons or entities
located within the United States who, from July 11,
2004 through March 31, 2008 . . . had an AdWords
3

All section references hereafter refer to the California
Business and Professions Code.
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account with Google and were charged for clicks on
advertisements appearing on parked domain and/or
error page websites,” with exclusions.4 Pulaski, on
behalf of the putative class, seeks restitution of
moneys Google wrongfully obtained from the
putative class.
Pulaski moved for class certification pursuant to
Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
(“Rule 23”) for a Rule 23(b)(3) class.
Pulaski
proposed three different methods for calculating
restitution, all of which were based on a “but for” or
“out-of-pocket loss” calculation:
the difference
between what advertisers actually paid and what
they would have paid had Google informed them that
their ads were being placed on parked domains and
error pages. The first approach is based on Google’s
Smart Pricing formula as described above. The
amount of restitution owed a class member would be
the difference between the amount the advertiser
actually paid and the amount paid reduced by the
Smart Pricing discount ratio. The second method is
the Content Pricing approach,5 which factors in the
lower bidding that would have occurred had
advertisers been allowed to bid separately on parked
domains and error pages. Search Feed clicks were
priced higher than Content Network clicks, which in
turn were considered more desirable than parked
4

Beginning in March 2008, the AdWords interface allowed
advertisers to exclude parked domain and error pages from the
set of websites on which their ads could appear.
5

This method focuses on clicks on parked domains and error
pages in Google’s Search Feed, not on Content Network
websites.
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domains and error pages. Accordingly, where the
same ad appeared both in the Search Feed and on
Content Network websites, those Content Network
ad prices could serve as a conservative but-for price
for Search Feed clicks on parked domains and error
pages.
The third method is the Full Refund
approach, in which advertisers would receive full
refunds for clicks on ads placed on parked domains
and error pages. Because some methods may work
better than others for certain subsets of class
members, Pulaski presented these methods as
possibly complementary.
In ruling on the class certification motion, the
district court initially found that the proposed class
satisfied all of the criteria under Rule 23(a):
numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequate
representation.
The court next turned to the
predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3). On that
issue, it found that, even assuming the plaintiff class
could prevail on liability, common questions did not
predominate on the issues of entitlement to
restitution and amount of restitution due each class
member.
First, the court expressed concern that individual
questions may arise in ascertaining entitlement to
restitution. It observed that “the question of which
advertisers among the hundreds of thousands of
proposed class members are even entitled to
restitution would require individual inquiries.” In
particular, the court was concerned with how to
“systematic[ally] . . . identify and exclude from
Plaintiffs’ proposed class the many advertisers who
have no legal claim to restitution because they
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derived direct economic benefits from ads placed on
parked domains and error pages.”
Second, the court identified individual questions
that would arise in determining the amount of
restitution owed to the class and individual class
members. The court explained that our decision in
Yokoyama, which held that damages calculations
alone cannot defeat class certification, did not control
the outcome of this issue because Yokoyama cited to
decisions that mentioned a “workable method for
calculating monetary recovery.” Here, the court held
that the plaintiffs had not proposed a method that
was workable. The court explained that different
costs for each advertiser, each ad, and each click,
overlaid with an auction process, make it “more
difficult to calculate what AdWords customers would
have paid ‘but for’ the alleged misstatements or
omissions.” It concluded that Pulaski’s proposed
methods were insufficient to account for all of the
intricacies involved, including benefits received from
parked domain and error pages.
Concluding that individual questions predominated
on the issue of restitution, the court denied Pulaski’s
motion for class certification without addressing
whether class treatment was a superior method for
resolving the dispute as required by Rule 23(b)(3).
Thereafter,
Pulaski
filed
a
motion
for
reconsideration, which the district court denied.
We granted permission to appeal the order denying
class action certification as authorized by Rule 23(e)
[sic]. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(e).
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II. Standard of Review
A district court’s class certification ruling is
reviewed for abuse of discretion. See Parra v.
Bashas’, Inc., 536 F.3d 975, 977 (9th Cir. 2008). “A
district court would necessarily abuse its discretion if
it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law or
a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”
United States v. Hinkson, 585 F.3d 1247, 1259 (9th
Cir. 2009) (en banc) (quoting Cooter & Gell v.
Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990)). “[W]hen
an appellant raises the argument that the district
court premised a class certification determination on
an error of law, our first task is to evaluate whether
such legal error occurred.” Yokoyama, 594 F.3d at
1091. “If the district court’s determination was
premised on a legal error, we will find a per se abuse
of discretion.” Id. Otherwise, “we will proceed to
review the district court’s class certification decision
for abuse of discretion as we have always done.” Id.
III. Discussion
To obtain certification, a putative class must satisfy
four prerequisites:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable; (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class;
(3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of
the class; and (4) the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.
Rule 23(a). Additionally, the proposed class must
qualify as one of the types of class actions identified
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in Rule 23(b). Here, Pulaski sought to certify a class
under Rule 23(b)(3). Under Rule 23(b)(3), the court
must find that “questions of law or fact common to
class members predominate over any questions
affecting only individual members,” and that a class
action is “superior to other available methods for
fairly and efficiently adjudicating the controversy.”
Pulaski must “affirmatively demonstrate . . .
compliance with the Rule.” Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v.
Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011). The question of
certification requires a “rigorous analysis.”
Id.
Courts may have to “probe behind the pleadings
before coming to rest on the certification question.”
Id.
The district court denied certification because it
found that the putative class did not meet the
predominance requirement.
It explained that
questions regarding which advertisers are entitled to
restitution in the first instance, and the amount of
restitution owed to each advertiser, both defeat
predominance. We disagree.
A.
Entitlement to restitution is a separate inquiry
from the amount of restitution owed under
California’s UCL and FAL. To the extent that the
district court rested its holding that common
questions do not predominate on the putative class’s
entitlement to restitution, it committed legal error.
The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair, or
fraudulent business act or practice.” § 17200. The
FAL prohibits “untrue or misleading” statements in
the course of business. § 17500. This language is
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“broad” and “sweeping” to “protect both consumers
and competitors by promoting fair competition in
commercial markets for goods and services.” Kwikset
Corp. v. Super. Ct., 51 Cal. 4th 310, 320 (2011).
To state a claim under the UCL or the FAL “based
on false advertising or promotional practices, it is
necessary only to show that members of the public
are likely to be deceived.” In re Tobacco II Cases,
46 Cal. 4th 298, 312 (2009); 6 see also Stearns v.
Ticketmaster Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1020 (9th Cir.
2011) (holding that a district court erred in denying
class certification by requiring individualized proof of
reliance and causation, and remanding in light of In
re Tobacco II Cases), cert. denied, 132 S. Ct. 1970
(2012). This inquiry does not require “individualized
proof of deception, reliance and injury.”
In re
Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 320; Stearns,
655 F.3d at 1020 (same). “[I]n effect, California has
6

Since the passage of California’s Proposition 64 in 2004,
private suits must also allege standing under the UCL and
FAL, i.e., that the plaintiff “suffered injury in fact” and “lost
money or property as a result of unfair competition.” Kwikset,
51 Cal. 4th at 320-21 (noting that the proposition “curtailed the
universe of those who may enforce” the UCL and FAL, although
the laws’ “substantive reach . . . remains expansive”). There is
a two-part test for standing under the UCL and FAL: the
person must “(1) establish a loss or deprivation of money or
property sufficient to qualify as an injury in fact, i.e., economic
injury, and (2) show that that economic injury was the result of,
i.e., caused by, the unfair business practice or false advertising
that is the gravamen of the claim.” Id. at 322. Here, the
district court determined that one of the class representatives
had standing to sue, and that the class representative’s
standing satisfied the standing requirements for the putative
class as a whole. Neither party challenges the district court’s
ruling on statutory standing. We therefore do not address it.
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created what amounts to a conclusive presumption
that when a defendant puts out tainted bait and a
person sees it and bites, the defendant has caused an
injury; restitution is the remedy.” Stearns, 655 F.3d
at 1021 n. 13.7

7

Stearns, which was decided before the district court’s ruling
here, also noted that predominance may not exist in a UCL case
in which different members of the class were “exposed to quite
disparate information from various representatives of the
defendant.” 655 F.3d at 1020. We have elaborated on this
concept in two cases that post-date the district court’s order.
See Mazza v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 666 F.3d 581, 596 (9th
Cir. 2012) (holding that common questions did not predominate
where disparate information exposure undercut presumption of
reliance); Berger v. Home Depot USA, Inc., 741 F.3d 1061, 1069
(9th Cir. 2014) (holding that predominance did not exist for a
putative UCL class whose members had each been exposed to
one of five different contracts, each of which may or may not
have alerted customers that a damage waiver was an optional
purchase). Google argues that the facts here present an
example of disparate exposure under this line of cases. Pulaski
responds that Google’s deception was pervasive: all AdWords
customers could select Search Feed pages, Content Network
pages, or both; parked domain and error pages were never
mentioned in AdWords’s sign-up materials; Google’s contracts
with advertisers never disclosed that Google would place their
ads on parked domains and error pages, regardless of whether
they chose Search Feed pages, Content Network pages, or both;
and Google’s materials answering frequently asked questions
did not disclose ad placement on parked domain and error
pages. Because Pulaski’s claim rests on allegations of deception
through omission and falsehoods via the AdWords sign-up
materials, all of which were presented to putative class
members through the same online portal, Google’s argument
that disparate information defeats predominance is
unpersuasive.
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Under the UCL:
Any person who engages, has engaged, or
proposes to engage in unfair competition may
be enjoined in any court of competent
jurisdiction. The court may make such orders
or judgments, including the appointment of a
receiver, as may be necessary to prevent the
use or employment by any person of any
practice which constitutes unfair competition,
as defined in this chapter, or as may be
necessary to restore to any person in interest
any money or property, real or personal, which
may have been acquired by means of such
unfair competition.
§ 17203. This language, as well as “nearly identical”
language under the FAL, see § 17535, grants a court
discretion to order restitution. Cortez v. Purolator
Air Filtration Prods. Co., 23 Cal. 4th 163, 173 (2000).
Thus, a court need not make individual
determinations regarding entitlement to restitution.
Instead, restitution is available on a classwide basis
once the class representative makes the threshold
showing of liability under the UCL and FAL.
Accordingly, the district court erred in holding that
such individual questions would predominate.
B.
We held in Yokoyama that “damage calculations
alone cannot defeat certification.” 594 F.3d at 1094.
By concluding that it was not bound by Yokoyama
under the circumstances presented in this case, the
district court erred.
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Yokoyama concerned the Hawaii Deceptive
Practices Act, Haw. Rev. Stat § 480-2. We concluded
that the district court erred when it held that this
law required individualized showings of reliance
because Hawaii courts’ caselaw “look[ed] to a
reasonable consumer, not the particular consumer.”
Id. at 1092. As we noted, the case, at the liability
stage, would “not require the fact-finder to parse
what oral representations each broker made to each
plaintiff.” Id. at 1093. Rather, the liability portion
would be uniform, as it “will focus on the
standardized written material given to all plaintiffs
to determine whether those materials are likely to
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the
circumstances.” Id. Because it committed legal
error, its denial of class certification was a “[p]er [s]e
[a]buse of [d]iscretion.” Id.
The district court in Yokoyama also erroneously
concluded that the “damages calculation involved
highly
individualized
and
fact-specific
determinations,” a conclusion to which the district
court’s premise of subjective reliance may have
contributed. Id. In examining predominance for
class certification purposes, the district court had
considered factors such as:
the financial circumstances and objectives of
each class member; their ages; the [indexed
annuity product (“IAP”)] selected; any changes
in the fixed interest rate for that particular
IAP; the performance of the selected index;
any changes in the index margin for that
particular IAP; any cap on the indexed
interest; the length of the surrender periods;
whether the individual had undertaken or
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wanted to undertake an early withdrawal of
funds; any benefit the individual policy holder
derived from the form of the annuity itself,
including the tax-deferral of credited interest;
and the actual rate of return on the IAP.
Id. at 1093-94. We held that, even though all these
variables impacted damages calculations, the
individualized
calculations
did
not
defeat
predominance.
Id. at 1093; see also Stearns,
655 F.3d at 1026 (“We have held that the mere fact
that there might be differences in damage
calculations is not sufficient to defeat class
certification.” (citing Yokoyama)).
Google argues that Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, —
U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 1426 (2013), called Yokoyama’s
holding into question. There, in analyzing a putative
antitrust class, the Court held that the plaintiffs’
proposed damages model fell “far short of
establishing that damages are capable of
measurement on a classwide basis.” Id. at 1433.
The district and circuit courts had failed to inquire
into whether the model translated the “legal theory
of the harmful event into an analysis of the economic
impact of that event.”
Id. at 1435 (emphasis
omitted).
The Court reasoned that “a model
purporting to serve as evidence of damages in [a]
class action must measure only those damages
attributable to that theory. If the model does not
even attempt to do that, it cannot possibly establish
that damages are susceptible of measurement across
the entire class for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3).” Id. at
1433. In such a situation, “[q]uestions of individual
damage calculations will inevitably overwhelm
questions common to the class.” Id.
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Since Comcast, we have continued to apply
Yokoyama’s central holding. In Levya v. Medline
Industries, Inc., we reaffirmed that damage
calculations alone cannot defeat class certification.
716 F.3d 510, 513-14 (9th Cir. 2013) (citing
Yokoyama). We explained that Comcast stood for the
proposition that “plaintiffs must be able to show that
their damages stemmed from the defendant’s actions
that created the legal liability.” Id. at 514; see also
Roach v. T.L. Cannon Corp., 778 F.3d 401, 407
(2d Cir. 2015) (“Comcast held that a model for
determining classwide damages relied upon to certify
a class under Rule 23(b)(3) must actually measure
damages that result from the class’s asserted theory
of injury; but the Court did not hold that proponents
of class certification must rely upon a classwide
damages model to demonstrate predominance.”).
The putative class’s problem in Comcast was that the
damages model “did not isolate damages resulting
from any one theory of antitrust impact.” Levya,
715 F.3d at 514 (quoting Comcast, 133 S. Ct at 1431).
Following this discussion, we reversed a denial of
class certification in part because the “damages could
feasibly and efficiently be calculated once the
common liability questions are adjudicated.” Id.
We reaffirmed the proposition that differences in
damage calculations do not defeat class certification
after Comcast in Jimenez v. Allstate Insurance Co.,
765 F.3d 1161, 1167 (9th Cir. 2014) (quoting Levya,
including the portion quoting Yokoyama). As we
explained, our sister circuits have adopted “[s]imilar
positions” since Comcast. See id. at 1167-68 (citing
cases from the Sixth, Seventh, and Fifth Circuits);
see also Roach, 778 F.3d at 407-08 (citing cases from
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the First, Tenth, Fifth, Seventh, and Sixth Circuits,
as well as Levya and Yokoyama, to support the
proposition that Comcast did not hold that
Rule 23(b)(3) requires a classwide basis for damages
calculation).
In sum, Yokoyama remains the law of this court,
even after Comcast. Because “[d]amages calculations
alone . . . cannot defeat certification” under
Yokoyama, the district court erred in concluding that
Yokoyama “does not apply to the facts here.” Thus, it
abused its discretion in denying class certification on
this basis. See Yokoyama, 594 F.3d at 1090-92.8
C.
Google argues that the district court properly
denied Pulaski’s motion for certification under
Comcast because the proposed method for calculating
restitution was “arbitrary,” and thus does not satisfy
Rule 23(b)(3)’s predominance requirement.
See
Comcast, 133 S. Ct. at 1433. We disagree.
Restitution is “the return of the excess of what the
plaintiff gave the defendant over the value of what
the plaintiff received.” Cortez, 23 Cal. 4th at 174.
Restitution has two purposes:
“to restore the

8

Google also argues that the Supreme Court’s decision in
Dukes bars class certification here because, under Dukes,
certification is inappropriate based on a lone common question.
However, this argument is contrary to Dukes, which stated that
“for the purposes of Rule 23(a)(2), even a single common
question will do.” 131 S. Ct. at 2556. Further, the plaintiffs in
Dukes were pursuing a Rule 23(b)(2) class, rather than a (b)(3)
class. Id. at 2548-49. As the Court made clear, it did not
analyze Rule 23(b)(3). Id. at 2549 n.2.
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defrauded party to the position he would have had
absent the fraud,” and “to deny the fraudulent party
any benefits, whether or not for[e]seeable, which
derive from his wrongful act.” Nelson v. Serwold,
687 F.2d 278, 281 (9th Cir. 1982) (citing the
Restatement of Restitution).
Restitution under the UCL and FAL “must be of a
measurable amount to restore to the plaintiff what
has been acquired by violations of the statutes, and
that measurable amount must be supported by
evidence.” Colgan v. Leatherman Tool Grp., Inc.,
135 Cal. App. 4th 663, 698 (2006).
Where a
defendant has wrongfully obtained a plaintiff’s
property, “the measure of recovery for the benefit
received . . . is the value of the property at the time
of its improper acquisition . . . or a higher value if
this is required to avoid injustice” where the
property has changed in value.
Id. at 698-99
(quoting the Restatement of Restitution). Where
plaintiffs are “deceived by misrepresentations into
making a purchase, the economic harm is the same:
the consumer has purchased a product that he or she
paid more for than he or she otherwise might have
been willing to pay if the product had been labeled
accurately.” Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 329 (emphasis in
original).
As the California Supreme Court
explained while discussing economic harm in the
context of standing, this measure “is the same
whether or not a court might objectively view the
products as functionally equivalent”:
Two wines might to almost any palate taste
indistinguishable—but to serious oenophiles,
the difference between one year and the next,
between grapes from one valley and another
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nearby, might be sufficient to carry with it real
economic differences in how much they would
pay. Nonkosher meat might taste and in
every respect be nutritionally identical to
kosher meat, but to an observant Jew who
keeps kosher, the former would be worthless.
Id. at 329-30. Applying these concepts to other forms
of fraudulent omission, UCL and FAL restitution is
based on what a purchaser would have paid at the
time of purchase had the purchaser received all the
information.
In calculating damages, here restitution, California
law “requires only that some reasonable basis of
computation of damages be used, and the damages
may be computed even if the result reached is an
approximation.” Marsu, B.V. v. Walt Disney Co.,
185 F.3d 932, 938-39 (9th Cir. 1999). “[T]he fact that
the amount of damage may not be susceptible of
exact proof or may be uncertain, contingent or
difficult of ascertainment does not bar recovery.” Id.
at 939.
We conclude that Pulaski’s proposed method was
not “arbitrary,” as Google argues. The calculation
need not account for benefits received after purchase
because the focus is on the value of the service at the
time of purchase. Instead, in calculating restitution
under the UCL and FAL, the focus is on the
difference between what was paid and what a
reasonable consumer would have paid at the time of
purchase without the fraudulent or omitted
information. See Kwikset, 51 Cal. 4th at 329.
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Here, the harm alleged is Google’s placement of ads
on lower-quality web pages without the advertisers’
knowledge.
Pulaski’s principal method for
calculating restitution employs Google’s Smart
Pricing ratio, which directly addresses Google’s
alleged unfair practice by setting advertisers’ bids to
the levels a rational advertiser would have bid if it
had access to all of Google’s data about how ads
perform on different websites. Because restitution
under the UCL and FAL measures what the
advertiser would have paid at the outset, rather than
accounting for what occurred after the purchase,
using a ratio from Google’s data that adjusts for web
page quality is both targeted to remedying the
alleged harm and does not turn on individual
circumstances. Thus, the Smart Pricing method
measures the monetary loss “resulting from the
particular . . . injury” alleged.
See Comcast,
133 S. Ct. at 1434.9
IV. Conclusion
The district court erred by conflating restitution
calculation with the liability inquiry for UCL and
FAL claims, and by failing to follow our rule in
Yokoyama.
Further, the proposed method for calculating
restitution was not “arbitrary” under Comcast.
REVERSED and REMANDED.

9

Although we do not directly analyze the Content Pricing or
the Full Refund approaches, those methods may also be
appropriate for calculating restitution. We express no opinion
on the merits of any of the proposed methods.
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APPENDIX B
_______________
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
_______________
Case No.: 5: 08-CV-3369 EJD
(Re: Docket Nos. 227, 278)
_______________
IN RE GOOGLE, ADWORDS LITIGATION
_______________
ORDER1 DENYING IN PART
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO STRIKE;
DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION
TO CERTIFY CLASS
_______________
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Presently before the Court are two matters: (1) a
Motion for Class Certification filed by Plaintiffs West
Coast Cameras (Richard Oesterling), Pulaski and
Middleman (Adam Pulaski), JIT Packaging (Michael
Hrbacek), and RK West (collectively, “Plaintiffs”);
and (2) Plaintiffs’ Motion to Strike.
This case involves Plaintiffs’ allegations that
Google, Inc. (“Defendant” or “Google”) allegedly
engaged in deceptive advertising and unfair,
deceptive and unlawful business practices regarding
1

This disposition is not designated for publication in the
official reports.
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Google AdWords. The named Plaintiffs seek to
represent a class of former and current Google
AdWords customers who purchased Google AdWords
services. In order to place the dispute in context, the
Court provides a brief background of the Google
AdWords product.
Google AdWords is a program that allows
advertisers to create online advertisements and
display them through various channels on the
Internet. Docket Item No. 272 at 3. These ads are
generally short text ads with hyperlinks that, when
clicked, take the user to the advertiser’s website. Id.
Ads placed through the AdWords program are
displayed on the Google Network, which includes the
Search Network and (during the class period) the
Content Network. Id. The Google Network also
included the parked domains and error pages that
are the subject of this lawsuit. Id.
A parked domain is a webpage that has a
registered web address but is relatively undeveloped
and consists primarily of ads or links displayed on
the page. Docket Item No. 272 at 3. Owners of
parked domains can participate in Google’s AdSense
for domains program (AFD) to display ads placed by
advertisers through the Ad Words program. Id. at 4.
Parked domains are part of both the Search and
Content Networks. Id.
Error pages are web pages that act as placeholders
when a user enters terms into the address bar of the
web browser that does not link to a registered URL.
Id. Rather than returning an error message saying
no web site could be found, Google’s AdSense for
errors program (AFE) may display a webpage that
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contains ads or links matching the terms entered by
the user, similar to the parked domains sites
described above. Id.
Internet users typically arrive at parked domains
and error pages (and view ads there) by entering
particular terms of interest to them, either in the
address bar of a web browser or a search box on a
parked domain or error page. Docket Item No. 272
at 5. Google’s algorithms then attempt to match an
advertiser’s ads with the terms the user has entered.
Id. The ads that a user sees when he/she lands on a
parked domain or error page are therefore the
byproduct of the user’s own search actions. Id.
Plaintiffs allege that, throughout the Class Period,
all AdWords customers were given the choice of
advertising in Google’s Search or Content Networks,
yet Google never disclosed that regardless of which
network they chose, Google would place their ads on
parked domains or error pages. Docket Item No. 282
at 1. Plaintiffs contend that Google was aware of the
negative reputation of parked domains and error
pages, and took numerous steps to purposefully
conceal its involvement with these sites throughout
the Class Period. Id. According to Plaintiffs, Google
not only failed to disclose its practice of placing
AdWords customers’ ads on parked domains and
error pages on its AdWords sign-up and Help Center
pages, but purposefully published misleading
AdSense policies which prohibited publishers from
putting ads on pages lacking content, and “rolled up”
the URLs of AFD and AFE sites on Google’s
Placement Performance Reports so that advertisers
could not see the actual sites upon which Google had
placed their ads.
Docket Item No. 282 at 2.
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Plaintiffs claim that Google feared the truth being
revealed because it would risk losing the substantial
revenue that it earned from its AFD and AFE
programs, and also would risk damage to its own
reputation. Docket Item No. 282 at 1.
Google argues that Plaintiffs and their experts
fundamentally
misunderstand
how
Google’s
AdWords product works. Docket Item No. 262 at 1.
For instance, Google contends that Plaintiffs
presume that every single ad that appeared on any
parked domain or error page was intrinsically
worthless and harmful, without accounting for the
many instances in which advertisers reaped
demonstrable benefits from such ads and without
regard to advertisers’ actual perceptions of parked
domains and error pages. Docket Item No. 272 at 1.
Additionally, Google maintains that, throughout the
class period, it made specific disclosures regarding
the AdWords network and the AdSense for domains
program. Id. at 7. Finally, Google argues that it
provides a tool that allows advertisers to self-help
and exclude their ads from entire categories of web
pages, including parked domains and error pages.
Id. at 8.
In July 2008, Plaintiffs initiated this lawsuit, 2
alleging that Google engaged in deceptive
2

Plaintiffs filed five separate but related class actions against
Defendant. See Levine v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-3369 JW (filed
Jul. 11, 2008), RK West, Inc. v. Google, Inc., No. C 08-03452 JW
(filed Jul. 14, 2008), Pulaski & Middleman, LLC v. Google, Inc.,
No. C 08-03888 JW (filed Aug. 14, 2008), JIT Packing, Inc. v.
Google, Inc., No. C 08-04701 JW (filed Oct. 10, 2008), Olabode v.
Google, Inc., No. C 09-3414 JW (filed July 27, 2009). The first
four cases were consolidated by the court on February 25, 2009
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advertising and unfair, deceptive and unlawful
business practices in violation of the California
Business and Profession Code Sections 17200 and
17500 by charging AdWords customers for any clicks
on their advertisements that Google placed on
parked domains or error pages from July 17, 2004
through March 31, 2008. Docket Item No. 228.
After several amendments to the pleadings, 3
Plaintiffs filed their Motion for Class Certification
(“Motion”). Docket Item No. 227. Google opposed
the motion, arguing that litigation of Plaintiffs’
claims would require individualized and factintensive inquiries that make class treatment
inappropriate.
See Defendant’s Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Class Certification Pursuant to
F.R.C.P. 23 (“Opp’n”), Docket Item No. 272.
Plaintiffs replied to the Opposition, submitting
expert witness declaration as support. See Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification (“Reply”), Docket Item No. 282;
Declaration of Dr Stan V. Smith Regarding
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification (“Smith
Declaration”), Docket Item No. 283. After the close
(the “Consolidated Cases”). See Order Granting Motion to
Consolidate, Docket Item No. 40. The fifth case, Olabode v.
Google, Inc., No. 09-3414 JW, was subsequently filed and
consolidated with the Consolidated Cases. See Stipulation and
Order Consolidating Olabode v. Google, Inc., No. 09-3414 JW
into In Re Google AdWords Litigation, No. 08-3369 JW, Docket
Item No. 67.
3

See Third Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint
for Violation of California Business and Professions Code
Sections 17200 et seq. and 17500 et seq., (“Complaint”), Docket
Item No. 166.
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of briefing on the class certification motion, Google
filed an objection pursuant to Civil Local Rule 7-3(d),
raising various objections to the Smith Declaration.
See Objections to Reply Evidence in Plaintiffs’ Reply
Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for
Class Certification, Docket Item No. 267. Plaintiffs
filed a motion to strike certain declarations filed by
Google in opposition to the class certification motion.
See Motion to Strike (“Mot’n to Strike”), Docket Item
No. 278.
On June 24, 2011, the court heard oral arguments
in support of and opposition to the Motion for Class
Certification and Motion to Strike. Docket Item No.
308. At the court’s request following the hearing, the
parties submitted supplemental briefs regarding the
issue of commonality. See Plaintiff’s Supplemental
Memorandum in Support of Their Motion for Class
Certification (“Plaintiff’s Supp’l Mem.”), Docket Item
No. 307; Google, Inc.’s Supplemental Brief in
Support of Its Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Class Certification (“Defendant’s Supp’l Mem.”),
Docket Item No. 306.
II. DISCUSSION
Before addressing Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification, the Court considers Plaintiffs’ Motion
to Strike certain declarations submitted by Google.
A.

MOTION TO STRIKE

In support of its Opposition, Defendant submitted
declarations of three employees: (1) Hal Varian, (2)
Jonathan Alferness, and (3) William Kunz. Plaintiffs
argue that each of the declarations should be
stricken to the extent they contain expert opinions
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offered under the guise of lay witness testimony.
Defendant responds that the testimony is that of lay
witness employees and thus falls outside the scope of
the Rule 26 disclosure requirements.
1.

Legal Standards
a.

Federal Rules
26 and 37

of

Civil

Procedure

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(a)(2), a
party must “disclose to other parties the identity of
any person who may be used at trial to present
evidence under Rules 702, 703, or 705 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(A). In
addition, Rule 26(a)(2)(B) requires:
[The] disclosure shall, with respect to a
witness who is retained or specially employed
to provide expert testimony in the case or
whose duties as an employee of the party
regularly involve giving expert testimony, be
accompanied by a written report prepared and
signed by the witness.
The report shall
contain a complete statement of all opinions to
be expressed and the basis and reasons
therefor; the data or other information
considered by the witness in forming the
opinions; any exhibits to be used as a
summary of or support for the opinions; the
qualifications of the witness, including a list of
all publications authored by the witness
within the preceding ten years; the
compensation to be paid for the study and
testimony; and a listing of any other cases in
which the witness has testified as an expert at

29a
trial or by deposition within the preceding four
years.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(2)(B).
Pursuant
to
Federal
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure 37(c)(1),
“[a]
party
that
without
substantial justification fails to disclose information
required by Rule 26(a) . . . is not, unless such failure
is harmless, permitted to use as evidence at a trial,
at a hearing, or on a motion any witness or
information
not
so
disclosed.”
Fed. R.
Civ. P. 37(c)(1).
b.

Federal Rules of Evidence 701 and 702

Under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, lay witnesses
may provide testimony that goes beyond percipient
observations and consists of opinions or inferences:
If the witness is not testifying as an expert,
the witness’ testimony in the form of opinions
or inferences is limited to those opinions or
inferences which are (a) rationally based on
the perception of the witness, (b) helpful to a
clear understanding of the witness’ testimony
or the determination of a fact in issue, and
(c) not based on scientific, technical or other
specialized knowledge within the scope of
Rule 702.
Fed. R. Evid.701.
Federal Rule of Evidence 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact
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in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by
knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education, may testify thereto in the form of
an opinion or otherwise, if (1) the testimony is
based upon sufficient facts or data, (2) the
testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods, and (3) the witness has applied
the principles and methods reliably to the
facts of the case.
Fed. R. Evid. 702.
While the text of Rule 701 appears to clearly
separate lay opinion testimony from that of experts,
the advisory committee note regarding subsection (c)
makes the distinction less obvious. For instance, a
lay witness may testify to the value of property or
expected profits without the necessity of qualifying
the witness as an accountant, appraiser, or similar
expert. Fed. R. Evid. 701 Advisory Committee Notes
to 2000 Amendment; see, e.g., Lightning Lube, Inc. v.
Witco Corp., 4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993). Such lay
opinion testimony is admissible not because of
experience, training or specialized knowledge within
the realm of an expert, but because of the
“particularized knowledge that the witness has by
virtue of his or her position in the business.” Id.
Since the 2000 amendment to Rule 701, courts
have continued to allow lay opinion testimony based
upon particularized knowledge obtained by virtue of
the witness’s position in the business. For example,
several courts have admitted fact and opinion
testimony from lay witnesses on a broad range of
“technical” or “specialized” subjects without
considering those witnesses “experts” under Federal
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Rule of Evidence 702. See Minority Television
Project, Inc. v. FCC, 649 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032
(N.D. Cal. 2009) (allowed Vice President of large
broadcasting station to hypothesize about impact
that commercial advertising might have on the
operations of other public radio stations because
“[m]ost, if not all of [the witness’s] testimony” [was]
based upon his particularized knowledge gained by
virtue of his position in the business); Hynix
Semiconductor, Inc. v. Rambus, Inc., No. CV-0020905 RMW, 2008 WL 504098, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
19, 2008) (noting that the business owner/employee
exception has survived the 2000 amendments to Rule
701); United States v. Munoz-Franco, 487 F.3d 25,
35-36 (1st Cir. 2007) (allowing bank employee to
explain a bank’s internal loan procedures and to
provide lay opinions on whether the disputed loan
classifications were appropriate even though
employee was not part of that loan department and
had no firsthand knowledge of the loans at issue);
Medforms, Inc. v. Healthcare Management
Solutions, Inc., 290 F.3d 98, 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002)
(permitted testimony of computer programmer
regarding terms contained in copyright registration
because programmer had personal knowledge of
their meaning, based on his everyday experience as a
computer programmer).4

4

The Ninth Circuit has not addressed the advisory committee
note in this specific context. It has, however, favorably relied on
a related paragraph of the note regarding admission of lay
opinion testimony based upon personal knowledge and
familiarity with narcotics. See United States v. Durham,
464 F.3d 976, 982 (9th Cir. 2006).

32a
The Court finds these cases “persuasive only in the
limited context described in the advisory committee
note regarding testimony about one’s business,” and
“does not believe they can be read to support a
broader ‘particularized knowledge’ exception to the
expert disclosure rules.” Hynix Semiconductor, No.
CV-00-20905 RMW, 2008 WL 504098, at *4.
Although, generally, “lay opinion testimony is
admissible only to help the jury or the court to
understand the facts about which the witness is
testifying and not to provide specialized explanations
or interpretations that an untrained layman could
not make if perceiving the same acts or events,”5 the
rules of evidence “have long permitted a person to
testify to opinions about their own business based on
their personal knowledge of their business,” as
illustrated in the cases discussed above. The Court
does not believe that the revisions to Rule 701 were
intended to exclude that form of personal testimony.
2.

The Proffered
Employees
a.

Testimony

of

Google’s

Declaration of Hal Varian

Hal Varian is Google’s Chief Economist. Opp’n to
Mot’n to Strike at 2. The majority of Dr. Varian’s
declaration provides a factual description of how the
AdWords pricing system works, based directly from
Dr. Varian’s personal knowledge and experience.
See Declaration of Hal Varian in support of Google’s
Opposition to Class Certification (“Varian Decl.”),
5

United States v. Conn, 297 F.3d 548, 553-54 (7th Cir. 2002)
(quoting United States v. Peoples, 250 F.3d 630, 641 (8th Cir.
2001)).
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¶¶ 1-4; 7-23. These facts are relevant and necessary
for the Court to have a basic understanding of a key
issue posed in Plaintiffs Motion for Class
Certification as to how the cost of advertising is
determined in the AdWords System. Opp’n to Mot’n
to Strike at 2. Plaintiffs do not contend that Dr.
Varian lacks the personal knowledge or experience to
testify about these underlying facts. Mot’n to Strike
at 7-11. In fact, Plaintiffs counsel conceded at oral
argument that the factual testimony of Google’s
employees is admissible.
See Transcript of
Proceedings Held on June 24, 2011 (“Hearing
Transcript”) at 19:24-20:5; 21:24-25; 27:14-18.
Plaintiffs contend, however, that Dr. Varian’s
declaration also contains opinions that should be
stricken as expert testimony in violation of Rule 26
disclosures. Mot’n to Strike at 8-11. According to
Plaintiffs, Dr. Varian should not be permitted to
opine, among other things, that there is “no ‘overall’
or ‘set price’ that could be applied uniformly across
hundreds of thousands of advertisers in the class.”
Varian Decl. at ¶ 16. Plaintiffs argue that this and
similar assertions constitute expert rebuttal
testimony on the viability of determining class-wide
restitution. Mot’n to Strike at 7.
Defendant responds that the primary purpose of
Varian’s Declaration is to explain to the Court how
advertisers are charged for the advertisements
placed through Google AdWords, the subject matter
of this litigation. Id. Additionally, Defendants argue
that Dr. Varian’s personal knowledge and experience
permits him to make certain assertions as a lay
witness under Rule 701. Opp’n to Mot’n to Strike at
4.
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The Court will admit Dr. Varian’s testimony
regarding his knowledge of how the AdWords system
works and his experience in applying economic
modeling to study the AdWords System. As Google’s
Chief Economist, Dr. Varian is qualified to explain,
as a lay witness, what Google’s AdWords system
does, how it behaves, and what it does when certain
variables are changed.
Here, just because the
underlying facts and data are technical in nature
does not transform the information into “expert
testimony” when those facts are within the personal
knowledge and experience of the company’s
employee. Dr. Varian may offer lay witness opinions
regarding Google’s business, so long as those
opinions are based on his own personal,
particularized knowledge and experience relating to
his employment at Google. See Lightning Lube, Inc.,
4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993); Minority Television
Project, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., 2008 WL 504098,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008); Munoz-Franco,
487 F.3d at 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007; Medforms, Inc.,
290 F.3d at 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002). To the extent that
Dr. Varian opines on the merits of the case, such as
the viability of classwide restitution, his testimony
will be disregarded. Accordingly, the Court DENIES
IN PART Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the Declaration
of Hal Varian.
b.

Declaration of Jonathan Alferness

Jonathan Alferness is a senior Google employee
who has worked extensively on AdWords for nearly
seven years. Opp’n to Mot’n to Strike at 4. During
Plaintiffs’ proposed class period, Mr. Alferness had
primary responsibility for Google’s AdSense for
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search and AdSense for errors program. Id. Mr.
Alferness has extensive personal knowledge of and
experience in how Google’s AdWord program
operates, including the data that is created in the
process. Id.
Plaintiffs do not contend that Dr. Varian lacks the
personal knowledge or experience to testify about
facts underlying Google’s AdWords or AdSense
programs. Mot’n to Strike at 11-13; see Transcript of
Proceedings Held on June 24, 2011 at 19:24-20:5;
21:24-25; 27:14-18. Instead, Plaintiffs rely on Funai
Elec. Co. v. Daewoo Elecs. Corp., No. C 04-1830 CRB,
2007 WL 1089702 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 11, 2007) and
move to strike the Alferness Declaration on the basis
that he reviewed and analyzed data of a named
plaintiff “for the purpose of assisting Google in this
litigation.” Mot’n to Strike at 11. Plaintiffs’ reliance
is misplaced. In Funai, the court focused on whether
an already disclosed expert, who was an employee of
the defendant, had to draft a written report. There,
the court determined that the employee had to
disclose expert testimony on “matters that are
outside the scope of his employment.” Id at 1. Here,
in contrast, the Alferness Declaration sets forth facts
that are within the scope of Mr. Alferness’
employment and concern data analysis with which
he is personally familiar. The fact that he reviewed
the data after Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was filed does not
preclude his testimony under Rule 701.
See
Lightening Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1174-75 (allowing
business owner to provide lay opinion testimony that
relied on facts developed for purposes of litigation).
Additionally, Plaintiffs argue that Mr. Alferness’s
testimony should be excluded because the underlying
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facts in the Alferness Declaration overlap with
certain facts contained in the report of an expert
previously retained by Defendant. Mot’n to Strike at
11-13. The Court is not persuaded by this argument
and finds that Mr. Alferness personal knowledge of
and day-to-day experience with AdWords are
sufficient to allow his testimony independent of any
previous factual recitation by Defendant’s prior
expert.6 Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’
motion to strike the Declaration of Jonathan
Alferness.
c.

Declaration of William Kunz

William Kunz is a manager in Goolge’s Partners
Solutions Organization, which serves as a
technical/engineering arm of the “publisher” side of
Google’s business. As part of Mr. Kunz’s daily job
responsibilities, he routinely pulls and analyzes data
related to the AdWords and AdSense products and
reports these matters to fellow Google employees.
Opp’n to Mot’n to Strike at 6.
Plaintiffs do not contest that Mr. Kunz has the
personal knowledge and experience to testify about

6

Mr. Alferness may offer lay witness opinions regarding
Google’s business, so long as those opinions are based on his
own personal, particularized knowledge and experience relating
to his employment at Google. See Lightning Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d
1153 (3d Cir. 1993); Minority Television Project, Inc., 649 F.
Supp. 2d at 1032 (N.D. Cal. 2009); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc.,
2008 WL 504098, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008); MunozFranco, 487 F.3d at 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007; Medforms, Inc.,
290 F.3d at 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002). The Court will disregard
Mr. Alferness’ testimony to the extent that he opines on the
merits of the case.
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the data described in his declaration. Motion to
Strike at 14; see Hearing Transcript at 19:24-20:5;
21:24-25; 27:14-18. Rather, Plaintiffs argue that Mr.
Kunz did not review the data until after the instant
lawsuit was filed and contend they are “prejudiced”
by Defendant’s presentation of the data analysis
testimony at this point in the litigation. Mot’n to
Strike at 14.
As previously discussed, the fact that Mr. Kunz
reviewed the data after Plaintiffs’ lawsuit was filed
does not preclude his testimony under Rule 701. See
Lightening Lube, Inc., 4 F.3d at 1174-75 (allowing
business owner to provide lay opinion testimony that
relied on facts developed for purposes of litigation).
Mr. Kunz routinely runs data pulls related to
Google’s AdWords and AdSense programs as part of
his daily job responsibilities. See Declaration of
William Kunz in support of Google’s Opposition to
Class Certification (“Kunz Decl.”), ¶ 2. Given this
day-to-day experience, Mr. Kunz is permitted to
explain, in the form of lay witness testimony, the
data that he pulled relating to the number of
advertisers who “opted out” of placing their ads on
parked domains and error pages through those
programs. Additionally, Mr. Kunz may offer lay
witness opinions regarding Google’s business, so long
as those opinions are based on his own personal,
particularized knowledge and experience relating to
his employment at Google. See Lightning Lube, Inc.,
4 F.3d 1153 (3d Cir. 1993); Minority Television
Project, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 2d at 1032 (N.D. Cal.
2009); Hynix Semiconductor, Inc., 2008 WL 504098,
at *5 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 19, 2008); Munoz-Franco,
487 F.3d at 35-36 (1st Cir. 2007); Medforms, Inc.,
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290 F.3d at 110-11 (2d Cir. 2002). Mr. Kunz may
not, however, opine on the merits of the case, and
any such testimony will be disregarded by the Court.
Plaintiffs lack support for their allegation of
prejudice due to Mr. Kunz’s opt-out data analysis.
First, Mr. Kunz is not an expert witness and the
Court will not permit him to testify as one. See
supra. Second, Defendant contends that Plaintiffs
failed to serve written discovery or ask deposition
questions about opt-out rates during class
certification discovery.
Any prejudice Plaintiffs
suffer as a result is not grounds for excluding Mr.
Kunz’s lay witness testimony that is based on
personal, particularized knowledge and experience
relating to his employment at Google. Accordingly,
the Court DENIES Plaintiffs’ motion to strike the
Declaration of William Kunz.
B.

MOTION TO CERTIFY CLASS

Plaintiffs move to certify the following class:
All Google AdWords Customers who, during
the period July 17, 2004 through March 31,
2008 (the “Class Period”), were charged by
Google for clicks on their advertisements that
Google placed on parked domains or error
pages.
Docket Item No. 228. Plaintiffs assert the proposed
class satisfies the requirements of Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b)(3).
Defendant
questions whether the class includes plaintiffs who
lack Article III standing, and disputes that Plaintiffs
have met the requirements for class certification.
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1.

Defendant’s Objections to Reply Evidence

As a threshold matter, the Court addresses
Defendant’s “Objections to Reply Evidence” pursuant
to Civil Local Rule 7-3(d), which was filed after the
close of briefing on Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class
Certification. See Objections to Reply Evidence
(“Objection”), Docket Item No. 267. In the Objection,
Defendant asks the Court to strike the Smith
Declaration on the basis that the declaration
constitutes “new evidence,” a previously undisclosed
expert opinion, and a regurgitation of prior reports.
Objection at 2. Plaintiffs argue that the Smith
Declaration simply responds to and rebuts the
opinions asserted by Defendant’s witnesses in the
Opposition. See Plaintiff’s Response to Google’s
Objections to Reply Evidence, Docket Item No. 290-1.
Having read the parties’ arguments, the Court
finds that the Smith Declaration does not contain
additional expert opinions or evidence, but instead
responds to the criticisms and evidence presented by
Defendant’s Opposition, drawing upon Dr. Smith’s
previously disclosed expert reports and documents
that
Defendant
produced
during
discovery.
Accordingly, the Court DENIES Defendant’s request
to strike the Smith Declaration and any references to
it in the Reply Brief.
2.

Standing

Before considering whether Plaintiffs’ proposed
classes meet the requirements of Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 23, the Court will determine whether
Plaintiffs and members of the proposed class have
Article III standing. See Easter v. Am. West Fin.,
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381 F.3d 948, 962 (9th Cir. 2004).
Defendant
expresses doubts as to whether some of the named
Plaintiffs have standing, Opp’n at 11, and challenges
the standing of the potential members of the
proposed class. Opp’n at 13-15.
a.

Standing of Class Representatives

The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or
fraudulent business act or practice.” Cal. Bus. &
Prof. Code § 17200. California’s FAL also prohibits
any “unfair, deceptive, untrue, or misleading
advertising.” Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code § 17500. “Any
violation of the false advertising law” necessarily
violates the UCL. Williams v. Gerber Products
Company, 552 F.3d 934 (9th Cir. 2008).
In 2004, Proposition 64 amended the standing
requirements under the UCL and FAL so that a
private plaintiff has standing to bring a UCL or FAL
action if the plaintiff “has suffered injury in fact and
has lost money or property as a result of the unfair
competition.” Cal. Bus. & Prof.Code §§ 17204, 17535.
The California Supreme Court has held that the
phrase “[‘as a result’] of imposes an actual reliance
requirement on plaintiffs prosecuting a private
enforcement action under the UCL’s fraud prong.”
In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298, 326 (2009).
A plaintiff can prove reliance “by showing that the
defendant’s misrepresentation or nondisclosure was
an immediate cause of the plaintiffs injury-producing
conduct.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted). One way for a plaintiff to prove that the
omission was “an immediate cause” of the plaintiffs
injury-producing conduct is by showing that, in the
absence of the omission, the named plaintiff “in all
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reasonable probability would not have engaged in
the injury-producing conduct.”
Id. (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted). “Moreover, a
presumption, or at least an inference, of reliance
arises wherever there is a showing that a
misrepresentation was material.” Id. at 326-327
(citation omitted).
Under California law, a
misrepresentation is considered material “if a
reasonable man would attach importance to its
existence or nonexistence in determining his choice
of action in the transaction in question . . . .” Id.
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Here, named Plaintiff Pulaski & Middleman, LLC
(“Pulaski & Middleman”) alleges that (1) it viewed
parked domain and error pages as “low quality”
websites upon which it did not want to advertise, and
(2) Google knew Pulaski & Middleman was likely to
regard its placement of its ads on parked domains
and error pages “as important in determining [its]
chose of action.” Motion at 4-5, 17. Pulaski &
Middleman further assert that it was misled by
Google’s omissions, and that Google’s omissions
caused it to purchase advertising that it would not
otherwise have bought and to overpay for clicks on
ads on parked domains and error pages. Motion at
18. Additionally, Pulaski & Middleman contends
that, “in all reasonable probability,” had Google
adequately disclosed the truth, it would not have
acted as it did. Motion at 18; Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th
at 326. In other words, Pulaski & Middleman alleges
that Defendant’s omissions concerning its AdWords
system were material. The Court finds that these
allegations are sufficient to establish reliance.

42a
To establish standing under Article III, a plaintiff
must also demonstrate “concrete and particularized”
injury. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 560 (1992). The injury here meets both of those
requirements. Pulaski & Middleman has submitted
evidence in support of its allegation that, as a result
of Google’s deception and unfair business practices, it
purchased advertising that it otherwise would not
have. Motion at 4-5; see Ex. 20, Pulaski Second
Suppl. Resp. to Interrog. No. 7; see Ex.12, Pulaski
Suppl. Resp. to Interrog. No. 8. By this evidence,
Pulaski & Middleman has sufficiently shown that it
has “lost money or property” so as to confer standing.
See e.g., Tobacco II, 46 Cal. 4th 298; Kwikset v.
Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 319-325 (in UCL
action, one of the “innumerable ways” in which
economic injury can be shown is purchasing more
products or services than the plaintiff otherwise
would have purchased). For the foregoing reasons,
the court finds that the named Plaintiff Pulaski &
Middleman has met the injury-in-fact requirement
for standing under the UCL and FAL, and under
Article III.
In UCL and FAL class actions, Article III standing
is satisfied if at least one of the named plaintiffs
meets the requirements. Stearns v. Ticketmaster
Corp., 655 F.3d 1013, 1021 (9th Cir. 2011) (citing
Bates v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 511 F.3d 974, 985
(9th Cir. 2007) (en banc); Fleming v. Pickard,
581 F.3d 922, 924 n. 3 (9th Cir. 2009); and Casey v.
Lewis, 4 F.3d 1516 (9th Cir. 1993)). Thus, the court
need not examine whether the other named
Plaintiffs satisfy the requirements of Article III.
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b.

Standing of Unnamed Class Members

Defendant argues that even in UCL cases, absent
class members must satisfy Article III standing, and,
as a result, the question of whether each member has
suffered a concrete injury requires a fact intensive
individualized inquiry. Opp’n at 13-15. Plaintiffs
disagree, arguing that only the named class
representatives must meet standing requirements
after the California Supreme Court’s decision in In re
Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th 298. Reply at 3-5.
The requirements of Article III turn on the nature
of the claim that is asserted. See Warth v. Seldin,
422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). In California, relief under
the UCL and FAL 7 “is available without
individualized proof of deception, reliance, and
injury.” In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 320.
Claims under the UCL and FAL are subject to an
objective test that requires a plaintiff only “show
that members of the public are likely to be deceived”
by a defendant’s representations about its product.
Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020 (quoting In re Tobacco II
Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 320). However, as noted above
in Section II.B.2.a., the UCL and FAL still require
that plaintiffs suffer injury in fact. Cal. Bus. & Prof.
Code §§ 17204, 17535. The requirement of concrete
injury is satisfied when the Plaintiffs and class
members in UCL and FAL actions suffer an
economic loss caused by the defendant, namely the
purchase of defendant’s product containing
misrepresentations.
Bruno v. Quten Research
7

Claims under the FAL and UCL rely on the same objective
test, In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 312, and thus the
court addresses them together in this analysis.
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Institute, LLC, ---F.R.D. ---, No. SACV 11-00173
DOC(Ex), 2011 WL 5592880, at *4 (C.D. Cal. Nov.
14, 2011); Stearns, 655 F.3d at 1020-21. Moreover, a
showing of concrete injury under the UCL and FAL
is sufficient to establish Article III standing. Bruno,
---F.R.D. ---, 2011 WL 5592880, at *4; Stearns,
655 F.3d at 1020-21. Thus, any inquiry into whether
the unnamed class members satisfy Article III
standing depends upon an objective test, not a factintensive inquiry as Defendants contend.
Here, the court need not analyze unnamed class
members’ Article III standing because Pulaski &
Middleman’s Article III standing has already been
established. “[T]he majority of authority indicates
that it is improper for [the court] to analyze
unnamed class members’ Article III standing
where . . . Defendants do not successfully challenge
the putative class representative’s standing.” Bruno
v. Quten Research Institute, LLC, ---F.R.D. ---,
No. SACV 11-00173 DOC(Ex), 2011 WL 5592880, at
*5 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 14, 2011) (citing Lewis v. Casey,
518 U.S. 343, 395 (1996) (Souter, J., concurring)
(class certification “does not require a demonstration
that some or all of the unnamed class could
themselves satisfy the standing requirements for
named plaintiffs.”)). As the Ninth Circuit observed
in Stearns, this Circuit has repeatedly held that “[i]n
a class action, standing is satisfied if at least one
named plaintiff meets the requirements . . . . Thus,
we consider only whether at least one named
plaintiff satisfies the standing requirements.” Id.
(citing Stearns 655 F.3d at 1021). Numerous district
courts in California have reached the same
conclusion, that standing “is assessed solely with
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respect to class representatives, not unnamed
members of the class.” 8 There are, however,
numerous district courts in California that have
found just the opposite: that even absent class
members must establish Article III standing.9 The
Central District of California recently examined this
paradox and concluded that, in UCL or FAL cases,
the court need not analyze the standing of unnamed
class members where Article III standing has been
established for at least one named plaintiff. Bruno,
8
See Aho v. AmeriCredit Financial Services, Inc.,
— F.R.D. —, Case No. 10-CV-1373 DMS (BLM), 2011 WL
5401799, at *9 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2011) (limiting the court’s
inquiry to the representative party, who met the standing
requirements of Article III); Zeisel v. Diamond Foods, Inc., Case
No. No. C 10-01192 JSW, 2011 WL 2221113, at *4 (N.D. Cal.
June 7, 2011) (“in general, standing in a class action is assessed
solely with respect to class representatives, not unnamed
members of the class”) (internal citation omitted); Greenwood v.
Compucredit Corp., Case No. 08-04878 CW, 2010 WL 4807095,
at * 3 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 19, 2010) (holding that “Plaintiffs are not
required to establish absent class members’ individual reliance
and personal standing”); Chavez v. Blue Sky Natural Bev. Co.,
268 F.R.D. 365, 376 (N.D. Cal. 2010) (“unnamed class members
in an action under the [California] Unfair Competition Law
(“UCL”) . . . are not required to establish standing.”).
9

See O’Shea v. Epson Am., Inc., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
105504, at *28-31 (C.D. Cal. Sept. 19, 2011) (holding that
absent class members must satisfy the requirements of Article
III); Sanders v. Apple Inc., 672 F. Supp. 2d 978, 991 (N.D. Cal.
2009) (Fogel, J.) (same); Webb v. Carter’s Inc., 272 F.R.D. 489
(C.D. Cal. 2011) (holding absent class members in UCL action
must satisfy Article III standing requirements); In re Light
Cigarettes Mktg. Sales Practices Litig., 271 F.R.D. 402, 416-20
(D. Me. 2010) (same); Burdick v. Union Sec. Ins. Co., No. CV 074028 ABC, 2009 WL 4798873, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 9, 2009)
(same).
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---F.R.D. ---, 2011 WL 5592880, at *4-5. The court in
Bruno also adopted a rule that, “where the class
representative has established standing and
defendants argue that class certification is
inappropriate because unnamed class members’
claims would require individualized analysis of
injury or differ too greatly from the plaintiffs, a court
should analyze these arguments through Rule 23
and not by examining the Article III standing of the
class representative or unnamed class members.” Id.
This court is persuaded by the well-reasoned
analysis in Bruno and concludes that where one class
representative in a UCL or FAL class action has
already established Article III standing, the court
need not analyze the standing of unnamed class
members. 10 Additionally, this court finds it more
appropriate to address Defendants’ argument
regarding the fact-intensive, highly individualized
analysis of injury under Rule 23(b) in section
II.B.3.c., below.
3.

Legal
Standard
Certification

for

Class

Action

A party seeking class certification must provide
facts sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23. Doninger v. Pacific
Northwest Bell, Inc., 564 F.2d 1304, 1308-09 (9th
Cir. 1977). Under Rule 23(a), a class may only be
10

In any event, the proposed class here meets the standing
requirements of Article III. Consumers who purchased the
Google AdWords product have Article III standing, as they were
relieved of money in the transactions. See, e.g., Kwikset Corp.
v. Superior Court, 51 Cal. 4th 310, 329 (2011); Stearns,
655 F.3d at 1021.
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certified if (1) the class is so numerous that joinder of
all members is impracticable; (2) there are questions
of law or fact common to the class; (3) the claims or
defenses of the representative parties are typical of
the claims or defenses of the class; and (4) the
representative parties will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class. Fed. R. Civ. P.
23(a). In addition, the party seeking certification
must show that the action falls within one of the
three subsections of Rule 23(b).
In this case, Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant
to 23(b)(3), which permits certification of cases where
“the court finds that the questions of law or fact
common to class members predominate over any
questions affecting only individual members, and
that a class action is superior to other available
methods for fairly and efficiently adjudicating the
controversy.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs bear
the burden of demonstrating that they have met the
four requirements of Rule 23(a) as well as the
predominance and superiority requirements of
Rule 23(b)(3). See Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst.,
Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1186 (9th Cir. 2001), amended
by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001).
A trial court has broad discretion in making the
decision to grant or deny a motion for class
certification. Bateman v. American Multi-Cinema,
Inc., 623 F.3d 708, 712 (9th Cir. 2010). A party
seeking class certification must affirmatively
demonstrate compliance with Rule 23 and be
prepared to prove that the requirements of Rule 23
are met. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct.
2541, 2550-51 (2011). This requires a district court
to conduct a “rigorous analysis” that frequently “will
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entail some overlap with the merits of the plaintiffs
underlying claim.” Id.
a.

Ascertainability

Defendant argues that this case presents a problem
of whether the class is ascertainable. According to
Defendant, even if the court would approve a class of
AdWords customers entitled to restitution, Plaintiffs
have not offered an appropriate mechanism for
determining who those customers might be. As
explained below, in Section II.B.3.c., there is no
systematic way to identify and exclude from
Plaintiffs’ proposed class the many advertisers who
have no legal claim to restitution because they
derived direct economic benefits from ads placed on
parked domains and error pages.11 See Opp’n at 6.
However, given the class definition proposed by
Plaintiffs, the court views this as an issue regarding
entitlement to restitution, not ascertainability.

11

Defendant contends that ascertainability of all class
members who are not entitled to restitution is impossible. The
vast majority of advertisers in the proposed class did not elect
to use Google’s tool to calculate conversion rates. Varian Decl.
at ¶ 21. As such, there is no class-wide method to determine the
benefits that advertisers may have received from sales or other
conversion events. Even if all AdWords accounts were opted
into conversion tracking, conversion rates alone may not be a
satisfactory measure of the overall benefits achieved from ads
placed on parked domains and error pages. See Bucklin Expert
Report (Docket Item No. 281-1) and Rebuttal Expert Rpt. of
Randolph E. Bucklin (Docket Item No. 281-2).
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b.

Rule 23(a) Requirements
1.

Numerosity

Numerosity is satisfied where “the class is so
numerous that joinder of all members is
impracticable.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a)(1). “‘[G]enerally
if the named plaintiff demonstrates that the
potential number of plaintiffs exceeds 40,’ the
numerosity requirement is satisfied.” Miletak v.
Allstate Ins. Co., 2010 WL 809579, at *10 (N.D. Cal.
Mar. 5, 2010) (citation omitted); see also O’Shea,
2011 WL 4352458 at *2. Plaintiffs seek to certify a
class consisting of hundreds of thousands of Google
AdWords customers.
Mot’n at 19.
Although
Defendant contests other Rule 23 requirements, it
does not dispute that Plaintiffs’ proposed class
satisfies the numerosity requirement. See Hearing
Transcript at 48:17-19.
Thus, the numerosity
requirement is met here.
2.

Commonality

To prevail under Rule 23(a)(2)’s commonality
standard, the plaintiff must establish common
questions of law and fact among class members.
This requirement is met through the existence of a
“common contention” that is of “such a nature that it
is capable of classwide resolution[.]”
Walmart
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. 2541, 2551 (2011).
As the Supreme Court explained in Dukes, the key
consideration in assessing commonality is “not the
raising of common questions—even in droves—but,
rather, the capacity of a classwide proceeding to
generate common answers apt to drive the resolution
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of the litigation.”
quotation omitted).

Id. (internal citations and

Not surprisingly, the parties in this case ask
different questions, and thus disagree about whether
class proceedings will generate common answers.
Plaintiffs present the following question which they
claim is a capable of classwide resolution: “whether
Google’s alleged omissions were misleading to a
reasonable AdWords customer.” Plaintiffs Supp’l
Mem. at 5-6. Defendant, in contrast, characterizes
the question as “whether the advertiser is entitled to
restitution.” Defendant’s Supp’l Mem. at 5.
In the court’s opinion, both parties’ proposed
questions are central to and will drive the litigation.
Plaintiffs’ question focuses on liability; Defendant’s
question focuses on restitution. Defendant may be
correct that the question of “whether the advertiser
is entitled to restitution” will generate individual
answers. But because Plaintiffs present a valid
common question, the commonality requirement is
satisfied. See Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556 (“We quite
agree that for purposes of Rule 23(a)(2) ‘[e]ven a
single [common] question’ will do.”) (internal
quotations and citations omitted); see also Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1019 (9th Cir. 1998)
(“All questions of fact and law need not be common to
satisfy [Rule 23].”).
As previously noted, Plaintiffs assert a claim under
the UCL’s “fraudulent” prong and a claim under
California’s FAL. For liability to attach under either
of these statutes based on false or deceptive
advertising, it is necessary only to show that
members of the public are “likely to be deceived” by
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the omissions. See O’Shea, 2011 WL 4352458 at *3;
In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal. 4th at 312 n. 8, (“A
violation of the UCL’s fraud prong is also a violation
of the false advertising law”)). Accordingly, a central
inquiry in this case is “whether Google’s alleged
omissions were misleading to a reasonable AdWords
customer.” This question is common to all members
of the putative class and, when answered, will be
dispositive of the issue of liability. See, e.g., O’Shea,
2011 WL 4352458 at *3. The Court therefore holds
that the commonality requirement set forth in
Rule 23(a)(2) is met. See Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556.
3.

Typicality

Plaintiffs’ claims are sufficiently typical to satisfy
Rule 23(a)(3). Under the requirement’s “permissive
standards,” claims are typical if they are “reasonably
co-extensive with those of absent class members;
they need not be substantially identical.” Hanlon v.
Chrysler Corp., 150 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 1998).
Here, Plaintiffs’ claims arise out of the same alleged
omissions as do the claims of all class members:
Google failed to disclose that, regardless of whether a
particular AdWords customer chose to be placed in
Google’s “Search” or “Content” network, Google
would place their ads on parked domains and error
pages, and charge them for clicks on those sites.
Because Plaintiffs’ claims involve the same legal
claim based upon the same course of events as do the
claims of all class members, the typicality
requirement is met here.
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4.

Adequacy

Under Rule 23(a)(4)’s adequacy requirement,
Plaintiffs must establish that they “will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 23(a)(4). In determining whether a proposed
class representative will fairly and adequately
protect the interests of the class, the Court asks two
questions.
First, do the proposed class
representatives and their counsel “have any conflicts
of interest with other class members”? Staton v.
Boeing Co., 327 F.3d 938, 957 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing
Hanlon, 150 F.3d at 1020). Second, will the proposed
class representatives and their counsel “prosecute
the action vigorously on behalf of the class?” Id.
Defendant briefly argues that named Plaintiff
Pulaski & Middleman has a professional relationship
with plaintiffs counsel, Foote Meyers, which creates
a financial entanglement that renders Pulaski &
Middleman an inappropriate class representative.
Opp’n at 10. However, a close examination of Adam
Pulaski’s deposition testimony reveals that the
nature of the relationship was purely professional,
involving shared work on two cases, as well as a few
referrals which did not involve referral fees. This
relationship is quite different from the long-standing
personal friendship and financial ties that the
Eleventh Circuit found inappropriate in London v.
Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 340 F.3d 1246, 1255 (11th Cir.
2003) (plaintiff and class counsel had a very close
friendship, class counsel had been plaintiffs stock
broker for many years, and plaintiffs recovery would
vastly exceed what any of the class members would
receive). As such, the court finds no evidence that
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Plaintiffs or their counsel have any conflicts of
interest with proposed class members.
Plaintiffs’ claims, as explained with respect to the
typicality requirement, are aligned with the claims of
proposed class members. Moreover, Plaintiffs are
represented by attorneys that have significant class
action experience–including class action experience,
including experience in UCL actions–that are
capable of fairly and adequately representing
Plaintiffs and the proposed class. Accordingly, the
adequacy requirement is also met here.
c.

Rule 23(b)(3) Requirements

In this case, Plaintiffs seek certification pursuant
to 23(b)(3). Thus, to certify a class action, Plaintiffs
must also satisfy the predominance and superiority
requirements of that rule. The test under Rule
23(b)(3) evaluates whether “adjudication of common
issues will help achieve judicial economy.” Aho,
2011 WL 5401799 at *9 (quoting Vinole v.
Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 571 F.3d 935, 944
(9th Cir. 2009) (internal citation omitted)). To this
end, it requires courts to determine whether “the
actual interests of the parties can be served best by
settling their differences in a single action.” Hanlon,
150 F.3d at 1022 (internal quotations omitted). A
plaintiff must show more than the mere existence of
a common question of law or fact to satisfy the
predominance inquiry under Rule 23(b)(3); he or she
must show that the common question of law or fact
predominates. Dukes, 131 S.Ct. at 2556. For the
reasons explained below, Plaintiffs do not meet this
requirement.
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In this case, there is a common question to resolve
the issue of liability: whether Google’s alleged
omissions were misleading to a reasonable AdWords
customer.12 See supra at 18-19. While this question
may weigh in Plaintiffs’ favor, the court is
unconvinced that such commonalities predominate
over questions affecting individual members of the
putative class.
Indeed, as mentioned above in
Section II.B.3.a., the question of which advertisers
among the hundreds of thousands of proposed class
members are even entitled to restitution would
require individual inquiries. See Mazur, 257 F.R.D.
at 567 (refusing to certify a class that included “nonharmed” members); In re Flash Memory Antitrust
Litig., No. C 07-0086 SBA, 2010 WL 2332081, at *12
(N.D. Cal. June 9, 2010) (denying certification where
damages methodology “would . . . sweep in an
unacceptable number of uninjured plaintiffs”).
Another obstacle to a finding that common issues
predominate is the individual nature of the
restitutionary relief sought, as class members each
paid different sums for each particular ad campaign
and for each instance in which an ad was clicked.
Varian Decl. at ¶ 6. While it is often true that
“[d]amages calculations alone . . . cannot defeat
certification,” Yokoyama v. Midland Nat’l Life Ins.
Co., 594 F.3d 1087, 1094 (9th Cir. 2010), that
12

The court rejects Defendant’s argument that individualized
questions of reliance and materiality must be proved here.
Opp’n at 14-17. As previously explained, Plaintiffs’ UCL and
FAL claims are governed by the “reasonable consumer” test,
which requires Plaintiffs to “show that members of the public
are likely to be deceived.” Williams v. Gerber Products Co.,
523 F.3d 934, 938 (9th Cir. 2008) (internal citations omitted).
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principle does not apply to the facts here. 13 The
amount that advertisers pay to use AdWords is
determined through an auction process that
generates a separate cost for each advertiser for each
ad and for each click, with the specific amounts
determined by the interplay of the bidding strategies
of the participating advertisers in a given auction.
See Opposition at 24-25. These intricacies make it
more difficult to calculate what AdWords customers
would have paid “but for” the alleged misstatements
or omissions. For instance, “every ad placed on
AdWords is priced differently, and the ultimate
amount Google charges for each ad depends on
dozens of factors that are unique to each ad
placement, unique to each individual advertiser, and
dependent on the unique attributes of each of the
other advertisers who also wished to place ads on the
particular web page at issue.” Varian Decl. at ¶ 6.
Furthermore, under the AdWords auction system,
“there is no ‘set’ price per click paid by all advertisers
that is knowable ahead of time; instead all
advertisers pay a different price that is determined
based on the interplay between all of the differing
13

In Yokoyama, the Ninth Circuit based its statement on two
decisions that confirm that certification is inappropriate where
plaintiffs cannot demonstrate a workable method for
calculating monetary recovery. See Smilow v. Sw. Bell Mobile
Sys., 323 F.3d 32, 40 n.8 (1st Cir. 2003) (noting in its discussion
of damages that “[c]ourts have denied class certification where
these individual issues are especially complex or burdensome”
(citing 5 J.W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Prac. § 23.46[2][b] at 23209 & n. 17)); Blackie v. Barrack, 524 F.2d 891, 905 (9th Cir.
1975) (affirming certification but noting that given the
particular facts of that case, “the process of computing
individual damages will be virtually a mechanical task”).
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maximum cost-per-clicks (i.e., ‘bids’) from all of the
advertisers participating in the auction.” Id. This
suggests that Plaintiffs cannot simply assume that a
reduction in the demand for advertising on AdWords
among some undefined group of advertisers would
lead to a lower “but for” price for all advertisers. See
Rebuttal Expert Report of Randolph E. Bucklin.
Thus, any effort to determine what advertisers
“would have paid” under a different set of
circumstances requires a complex and highly
individualized analysis of advertiser behavior for
each particular ad that was placed. See Bucklin
Expert Report and Rebuttal Expert Rpt. of Randolph
E. Bucklin.
To further complicate matters, advertisers have
widely varying goals, which makes it difficult to
calculate the actual value of what advertisers
received for their payments to Google.14 See Bucklin
Expert Report at TR 81-82. While the advertiser
account data maintained by Google tracks the cost of
advertising on parked domain and error pages, it
14

One way to measure the performance of an online ad is
based on “conversions.” Opp’n at 5; Alferness Decl. at ¶19. A
conversion occurs when a user clicks on an ad, arrives at the
advertiser’s designated web page, and completes some further
action to the benefit of the advertiser. Id. In 2009, only a small
percentage of active AdWords accounts were opted in to
conversion tracking. Opp’n at 6 (citing Bucklin Expert Report
(Docket Item No. 281-1) at 38). Even if all AdWords accounts
were opted into conversion tracking, conversion rates alone may
not be a satisfactory measure of the overall benefits achieved
from ads placed on parked domains and error pages. See
Bucklin Expert Report (Docket Item No. 281-1) and Rebuttal
Expert Rpt. of Randolph E. Bucklin (Docket Item No. 281-2)
(“Bucklin Rebuttal Report”).
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provides limited information on the value advertisers
receive as a result of that advertising. Id. at 83.
Although it is true that restitution need not be
determined with exact precision, it “must be based
on a specific amount found owing, and this
measureable amount of restitution due must be
supported by substantial evidence.” Ewert v. eBay,
Inc., Case Nos. C-07-02198 RMW, C-07-04487 RMW,
2010 WL 4269259, at *11 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2010)
(internal citation omitted).
The court is not
persuaded that, in this case, with these parties and
facts, restitution can be reliably measured using
common methods. Plaintiffs’ Full Refund Approach,
Smart Pricing Approach, and the Content Pricing
Approach do not sufficiently take into account the
unique circumstances surrounding the AdWords
auctions. For example, the “Full Refund Method”
would award full restitution of all fees paid to
Google, without taking into account the benefits
those members received or the fact that some
actively sought to have their ads placed on parked
domains and error pages. See Expert Report of Stan
V. Smith, Docket Item No. 228, (“Smith Report”) at
10; See Bucklin Rebuttal Report,¶¶ 58-61. Similarly,
the “Smart Pricing Method” would apply a uniform
discount for all ads placed on a parked domain —
even if an individual advertiser’s ads on that web
page outperformed ads appearing on other types of
websites (as was the case for named Plaintiff RK
West).
See Bucklin Rebuttal Report, ¶¶ 35-40.
Along the same lines, the Content Pricing Method
would award restitution to advertisers based on a
blanket assumption that all ads in Google’s Search
Network outperform ads on the Content Network,
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despite evidence that the opposite is true in many
cases, including the named Plaintiffs’ own
experiences.15 See Smith Report at 63; see Bucklin
Rebuttal Report at ¶¶ 44-57.
Since the purpose of restitution is to return class
members to status quo, the amount of restitution due
must account for the benefits received from ads
placed on parked domains and error pages. Here, in
many instances, individual proof would show that
advertisers received significant revenues and other
benefits from ads placed on parked domains and
error pages – benefits that would need to be
individually accounted for in any restitution
calculation.
Plaintiffs have not “affirmatively demonstrated”
that restitution can be calculated by methods of
common proof. See Dukes, at 10. While Plaintiffs
present a hypothetical “but for” price for advertising
on parked domains and error pages absent Google’s
alleged “deception,” they overlook the reality of how
advertising costs are actually determined in the
AdWords system.
Where, as here, proof of
restitution due each class member cannot be proved
with relative ease, the court finds good reason to
deny class certification.
Based on the foregoing, the court finds that
individualized issues of restitution permeate the
class claims. In light of such, it concludes that the
15

For example, named Plaintiff RK West experienced an
average conversion rate on the Search Network (5%) that
exceeded its performance on the Content Network (.7%).
Bucklin Rebuttal Report ¶ 52.
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proposed class is not “sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). Plaintiff
therefore fails to satisfy Rule 23(b)(3)’s requirement
that common issues predominate.16
III. CONCLUSION
Thus, for the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES
Plaintiffs’ motion for class certification. The Court
sets this matter for a Case Management Conference
to be held on February 17, 2012 at 10:00 a.m. The
parties shall file a Joint Case Management
Statement on or before February 10, 2012.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: January 5, 2012
/s/ Edward J. Davila
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge

16

Because the Court finds that individualized issues of
restitution preclude satisfaction of the predominance
requirement set forth in Rule 23(b)(3), it does not reach the
remaining inquiry of whether the proposed class action is
“superior” to the other methods available for adjudicating the
controversy. Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
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APPENDIX C
_______________
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF
CALIFORNIA
SAN JOSE DIVISION
_______________
Case No.: 5: 08-CV-03369 EJD
[Re: Docket Item No. 316]
_______________
IN RE GOOGLE, ADWORDS LITIGATION
_______________
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR LEAVE TO
FILE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
_______________
On January 19, 2012, Plaintiffs requested leave to
file a motion for reconsideration of the court’s Order
Denying Plaintiffs’ Motion to Certify Class. For the
reasons set forth below, Plaintiff’s motion is denied.
Civil L.R. 7-9 authorizes a request to file a motion
for reconsideration of an interlocutory order when
the requesting party can specifically show:
(1) That at the time of the motion for leave, a
material difference in fact or law exists from
that which was presented to the Court before
entry of the interlocutory order for which
reconsideration is sought. The party also must
show that in the exercise of reasonable
diligence
the
party
applying
for
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reconsideration did not know such fact or law
at the time of the interlocutory order; or
(2) The emergence of new material facts or a
change of law occurring after the time of such
order; or
(3) A manifest failure by the Court to consider
material facts or dispositive legal arguments
which were presented to the Court before such
interlocutory order.
Civil L.R. 7-9(b). The rule specifically prohibits the
repetition of any oral or written argument made in
support of or in opposition to the order which the
party now seeks to have reconsidered. The purpose
of a motion for reconsideration is to provide a vehicle
for a district court to correct a manifest error without
the need for an appeal. It is not an opportunity to
relitigate issues that have already been thoughtfully
decided.
Plaintiffs here attempt to show a “manifest failure”
by the court to consider their arguments that
(1) restitution awards can be calculated on a common
basis without burdensome individualized inquiries in
this case, (2) individual issues in calculating relief
should not defeat class certification as a matter of
law in any event, and (3) in the alternative, the court
should certify a class for liability purposes only.
The court considered and rejected both the factual
argument that restitution could be calculated
without individualized inquiries and the legal
argument that a class should be certified anyway.
See Order Denying Pls.’ Mot. Certify Class (“Order”)
at 22-25, Jan. 5, 2012, ECF No. 315 (distinguishing
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Yokoyama and Ewert based on the evidence
submitted about the AdWords auction system). The
instant request for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration is based upon an understandable
misreading of the order denying class certification, so
the court takes this opportunity to clarify any
ambiguity.
In the Order, the court considered whether
restitution could be calculated on a common basis for
all members of the proposed class. In doing so the
court analyzed each of Plaintiffs’ proposed
methodologies:
the “Full Refund Method,” the
“Smart Pricing Method,” and the “Content Pricing
Method.”
The court observed that “the ‘Smart
Pricing Method’ would apply a uniform discount for
all ads placed on a parked domain — even if an
individual advertiser’s ads on that web page
outperformed ads appearing on other types of
websites (as was the case for named Plaintiff RK
West).” Order at 24:14-17 (emphasis in original).
Plaintiffs argue that this statement shows that the
denial of class certification was based on the
erroneous conclusion that calculating restitution
requires each individual advertiser’s award to be
offset by the amount of benefit that advertiser
reaped from the placement of its ads.
Plaintiffs read too much into the Order. Plaintiffs
are correct that the appropriate restitution recovery
is the market value of the advertisements at the time
of purchase (appropriately discounted for the
allegedly undisclosed possibility of their appearance
on error pages or parked domains) subtracted from
the price actually paid.
But this restitution
calculation depends on the existence of a reliable and
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common method for calculating the discount. The
denial of the class certification motion was based on
the court’s determination that none of Plaintiffs’
proposed methods is sufficiently reliable on a classwide basis. The problem with the Smart Pricing
Method’s uniform discount is not that it would allow
recovery by some individual advertisers—like RK
West—for whom the parked-domain/error-page
placements turned out to be profitable. Rather, the
real problem is that there are so many advertisers
like RK West that applying a uniform discount is too
inexact a solution. See Bucklin Rebuttal Report
¶¶ 35-40. In coming to its conclusion, the court
considered Googie’s “admissions” about Smart
Pricing as well as both parties’ expert reports.
Finally, Plaintiffs’ fallback position—that a class
should be certified for liability purposes only—is
entirely new. It was never raised in the memoranda
in support of the motion for class certification, so it
does not meet the requirement of Civil L.R. 7-9(b)(3)
that the argument have been “presented to the Court
before [the] interlocutory order.” Deciding an issue
for the first time on a motion for reconsideration
would be procedurally improper.
Plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a motion for
reconsideration is DENIED.
The parties shall meet, confer, and file an updated
Joint Case Management Statement on or before May
9, 2012. The case management conference set for
May 11, 2012, will proceed as scheduled.
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IT IS SO ORDERED.
Dated: May 4, 2012
/s/ Edward J. Davila
EDWARD J. DAVILA
United States District Judge
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APPENDIX D
_______________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No.: 12-16752
D.C. No. 5:08-cv-03369-EJD
Northern District of California, San Jose
_______________
PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; et al.,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant – Appellee.
_______________
ORDER
_______________
Before: TASHIMA and PAEZ, Circuit Judges and
QUIST,* Senior District Judge.
Google, Inc.’s motion to stay the mandate pending
the filing of a petition for a writ of certiorari is
GRANTED. See Fed. R. App. P. 41(d)(2).
[FILED DECEMBER 21, 2015]

*

The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
sitting by designation.
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APPENDIX E
_______________
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
_______________
No.: 12-16752
D.C. No. 5:08-cv-03369-EJD
Northern District of California, San Jose
_______________
PULASKI & MIDDLEMAN, LLC; et al.,
Plaintiffs – Appellants,
v.
GOOGLE, INC., a Delaware corporation,
Defendant – Appellee.
_______________
ORDER
_______________
Before: TASHIMA and PAEZ, Circuit Judges and
QUIST,* Senior District Judge.
The panel has voted to deny the petition for panel
rehearing.
The full court has been advised of the petition for
rehearing en banc and no judge has requested a vote

*

The Honorable Gordon J. Quist, Senior District Judge for
the U.S. District Court for the Western District of Michigan,
sitting by designation.
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on whether to rehear
Fed. R. App. P. 35.

the

matter

en

banc.

The petition for panel rehearing and the petition
for rehearing en banc are DENIED.
[FILED DECEMBER 8, 2015]
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APPENDIX F
_______________
STATUTE AND RULE INVOLVED
_______________
28 U.S.C. § 2072. Rules of procedure and
evidence; power to prescribe
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to
prescribe general rules of practice and procedure and
rules of evidence for cases in the United States
district courts (including proceedings before
magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify
any substantive right. All laws in conflict with such
rules shall be of no further force or effect after such
rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a
district court is final for the purposes of appeal under
section 1291 of this title.
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. Class Actions
(a) Prerequisites. One or more members of a class
may sue or be sued as representative parties on
behalf of all members only if:
(1) the class is so numerous that joinder of all
members is impracticable;
(2) there are questions of law or fact common to
the class;
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(3) the claims or defenses of the representative
parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the
class; and
(4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
(b) Types of Class Actions. A class action may be
maintained if Rule 23(a) is satisfied and if:
(1) prosecuting separate actions by or against
individual class members would create a risk of:
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications
with respect to individual class members that
would establish incompatible standards of
conduct for the party opposing the class; or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual
class members that, as a practical matter,
would be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the individual
adjudications or would substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests;
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or
refused to act on grounds that apply generally to
the class, so that final injunctive relief or
corresponding declaratory relief is appropriate
respecting the class as a whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or
fact common to class members predominate over
any questions affecting only individual members,
and that a class action is superior to other
available methods for fairly and efficiently
adjudicating the controversy. The matters
pertinent to these findings include:
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(A) the class members’ interests in
individually controlling the prosecution or
defense of separate actions;
(B) the extent and nature of any litigation
concerning the controversy already begun by
or against class members;
(C) the desirability or undesirability of
concentrating the litigation of the claims in
the particular forum; and
(D) the likely difficulties in managing a class
action.
(c) Certification Order; Notice
Members;
Judgment;
Issues
Subclasses.

to Class
Classes;

(1) Certification Order.
(A) Time to Issue. At an early practicable
time after a person sues or is sued as a class
representative, the court must determine by
order whether to certify the action as a class
action.
(B) Defining the Class; Appointing Class
Counsel. An order that certifies a class action
must define the class and the class claims,
issues, or defenses, and must appoint class
counsel under Rule 23(g).
(C) Altering or Amending the Order. An
order that grants or denies class certification
may be altered or amended before final
judgment.
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(2) Notice.
(A) For (b)(1) or (b)(2) Classes. For any class
certified under Rule 23(b)(1) or (b)(2), the
court may direct appropriate notice to the
class.
(B) For (b)(3) Classes. For any class certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court must direct to
class members the best notice that is
practicable under the circumstances, including
individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The
notice must clearly and concisely state in
plain, easily understood language:
(i) the nature of the action;
(ii) the definition of the class certified;
(iii) the class claims, issues, or defenses;
(iv) that a class member may enter an
appearance through an attorney if the
member so desires;
(v) that the court will exclude from the
class any member who requests
exclusion;
(vi) the time and manner for requesting
exclusion; and
(vii) the binding effect of a class judgment
on members under Rule 23(c)(3).
(3) Judgment. Whether or not favorable to the
class, the judgment in a class action must:
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(A) for any class certified under Rule 23(b)(1)
or (b)(2), include and describe those whom the
court finds to be class members; and
(B) for any class certified under Rule
23(b)(3), include and specify or describe those
to whom the Rule 23(c)(2) notice was directed,
who have not requested exclusion, and whom
the court finds to be class members.
(4) Particular Issues. When appropriate, an
action may be brought or maintained as a class
action with respect to particular issues.
(5) Subclasses. When appropriate, a class may
be divided into subclasses that are each treated
as a class under this rule.
(d) Conducting the Action.
(1) In General. In conducting an action under
this rule, the court may issue orders that:
(A) determine the course of proceedings or
prescribe measures to prevent undue
repetition or complication in presenting
evidence or argument;
(B) require—to protect class members and
fairly conduct the action—giving appropriate
notice to some or all class members of:
(i) any step in the action;
(ii) the proposed extent of the judgment;
or
(iii) the members’ opportunity to signify
whether they consider the representation
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fair and adequate, to intervene and
present claims or defenses, or to
otherwise come into the action;
(C) impose conditions on the representative
parties or on intervenors;
(D) require that the pleadings be amended to
eliminate allegations about representation of
absent persons and that the action proceed
accordingly; or
(E) deal with similar procedural matters.
(2) Combining and Amending Orders. An order
under Rule 23(d)(1) may be altered or amended
from time to time and may be combined with an
order under Rule 16.
(e) Settlement, Voluntary Dismissal, or
Compromise. The claims, issues, or defenses of a
certified class may be settled, voluntarily dismissed,
or compromised only with the court’s approval. The
following procedures apply to a proposed settlement,
voluntary dismissal, or compromise:
(1) The court must direct notice in a reasonable
manner to all class members who would be bound
by the proposal.
(2) If the proposal would bind class members,
the court may approve it only after a hearing and
on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate.
(3) The parties seeking approval must file a
statement identifying any agreement made in
connection with the proposal.
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(4) If the class action was previously certified
under Rule 23(b)(3), the court may refuse to
approve a settlement unless it affords a new
opportunity to request exclusion to individual
class members who had an earlier opportunity to
request exclusion but did not do so.
(5) Any class member may object to the proposal
if it requires court approval under this
subdivision (e); the objection may be withdrawn
only with the court's approval.
(f) Appeals. A court of appeals may permit an
appeal from an order granting or denying classaction certification under this rule if a petition for
permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk
within 14 days after the order is entered. An appeal
does not stay proceedings in the district court unless
the district judge or the court of appeals so orders.
(g) Class Counsel.
(1) Appointing Class Counsel. Unless a statute
provides otherwise, a court that certifies a class
must appoint class counsel. In appointing class
counsel, the court:
(A) must consider:
(i) the work counsel has
identifying or investigating
claims in the action;

done in
potential

(ii) counsel’s experience in handling class
actions, other complex litigation, and the
types of claims asserted in the action;
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(iii) counsel’s knowledge of the applicable
law; and
(iv) the resources that counsel will
commit to representing the class;
(B) may consider any other matter pertinent
to counsel’s ability to fairly and adequately
represent the interests of the class;
(C) may order potential class counsel to
provide information on any subject pertinent
to the appointment and to propose terms for
attorney's fees and nontaxable costs;
(D) may include in the appointing order
provisions about the award of attorney’s fees
or nontaxable costs under Rule 23(h); and
(E) may make further orders in connection
with the appointment.
(2) Standard for Appointing Class Counsel.
When one applicant seeks appointment as class
counsel, the court may appoint that applicant
only if the applicant is adequate under Rule
23(g)(1) and (4). If more than one adequate
applicant seeks appointment, the court must
appoint the applicant best able to represent the
interests of the class.
(3) Interim Counsel. The court may designate
interim counsel to act on behalf of a putative class
before determining whether to certify the action
as a class action.
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(4) Duty of Class Counsel. Class counsel must
fairly and adequately represent the interests of
the class.
(h) Attorney’s Fees and Nontaxable Costs. In a
certified class action, the court may award
reasonable attorney’s fees and nontaxable costs that
are authorized by law or by the parties’ agreement.
The following procedures apply:
(1) A claim for an award must be made by
motion under Rule 54(d)(2), subject to the
provisions of this subdivision (h), at a time the
court sets. Notice of the motion must be served on
all parties and, for motions by class counsel,
directed to class members in a reasonable
manner.
(2) A class member, or a party from whom
payment is sought, may object to the motion.
(3) The court may hold a hearing and must find
the facts and state its legal conclusions under
Rule 52(a).
(4) The court may refer issues related to the
amount of the award to a special master or a
magistrate judge, as provided in Rule 54(d)(2)(D).

